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ABSTRACT 
 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE ECONOMIC MODEL VERSUS NEO-CLASSICAL 
PRINCIPLES: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND BURUNDI 
by 
Maxime Sarah Mianzokouna 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2018 
Under the Supervision of Professors Abera Gelan and Nolan Kopkin 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the significance of the developmental state model 
using the economic performances of two African countries, Burundi and Rwanda. The two 
neighboring African countries share similar economic characteristics and face virtually same social 
and political challenges. In the last two decades, Burundi and Rwanda have taken two different 
approaches to develop their economies. Burundi is using a standard neoclassical economic model 
in contrast to Rwanda that is applying the developmental state model. I use the standard method 
of difference-in-difference and the annual data over the period 1974-2014 from the two countries 
to compare the similarities and differences of their economic performances in order to learn the 
value of the developmental state model for African economies.  
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1 
CHAPTER  
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this thesis, I aim to explore the role of state policy and the market system in achieving 
economic development in African economies using the experiences of Burundi and Rwanda over 
the period 1974-2014. In both countries, poverty is the principal cause of hunger and desolation. 
A shortage in basic infrastructure stifles their economic performances and an insufficient 
healthcare system leads to some of the highest infant mortality rates in the world. The two countries 
also experience a lack of adequate access to educational opportunities and millions of their children 
are deprived of their vital intellectual and social development.  
By and large, the many socioeconomic problems and challenges that characterize of the 
two countries cannot be solved without economic development. In order to develop, however, 
Burundi and Rwanda not only must adopt the most suitable economic model, but also must adhere 
to a pertinent state policy in their respective countries. Khan (2011) states that a viable governance 
and sound economic policy could accelerate economic growth and sustain development if the state 
leadership has appropriate vision and commitment to the attainment of the goal of development. 
Or, as standard theories posit, the alternative approach would be to rely upon market forces to 
bring about desirable changes by transforming backward economies into advanced economies. In 
that case, the role of state is limited to creating rules and protecting private property rights. 
Although Burundi and Rwanda have recognized the need for economic development, 
especially after the horrific genocide that took place in Rwanda in 19941 and recurrent massacres 
                                                           
1 During April - July 1994, Hutus extremists massacred about one million Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 
2 
in Burundi, the development path that the two countries have taken is starkly different. Burundi’s 
policy is based on the neoclassical economic model of the laissez-faire economic philosophy where 
government policy interference with markets is very limited. Rwanda, on the other hand, embraced 
the developmental state model that emphasizes the crucial role of government activities to 
transform its economy from a subsistence economy into an advanced economy. In this thesis, I use 
selected primary data from Burundi and Rwanda in order to determine how well their economies 
have performed in the last twenty years given their respective economic models.  
The neoclassical development model that Burundi uses is based on the tenet of neoclassical 
economic theory. This theory conjectures that the interlinking of prices, outputs, and income 
distributions in the market economy is determined through supply and demand. Thus, the 
establishment of organized markets is a pivotal goal for development. This theory accredits 
market-virtues to its essential mechanism of increasing productivity and development. The 
prerequisite for successful economic development is the availability of investment that augments 
the growth rate of per capita output. In a perfectly competitive market that the neoclassical theory 
assumes to prevail, entrepreneurs are motivated by potential rent benefits to innovate and discover 
new methods to produce goods and services. The success of rent creation gives rise to the creation 
of wealth and leads to the realization of development as a result of that process. It is equally 
important to note that according to the neoclassical economic theory, the appropriate role of the 
state in a market economy is that of a nightwatchman. That is to say, for development to ensue in 
less developed countries, such as in Burundi, the role of the state must be limited to minimum 
activities.2 The central argument for a limited role of the state in a market economy is built around 
                                                           
2 State role, by and large, is limited to the protection of individual and property rights, the enforcement of contracts 
and the protection of competition among economic actors, etc.  
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the theory of rent-seeking.  Rent-seeking is the direct opposite to rent creation. It refers to the 
transference of already generated wealth through unethical or illicit means by state agencies to 
preferred clients (Zenawi, 2012). The state is not only a conduit for rent-seeking activities, but also 
a source for the perpetuation of rent-seeking that creates and preserves inefficient resource 
allocation. As much as the role of the state is incongruous to the process of rent-creation, it is 
rational to appeal to the nightwatchman theory of the state in neoclassical economic development. 
The atomistic paradigm of neoclassical economics assumes perfect mobility of resources 
and unconstrained interaction among economic agents in a leveled playing field. In this unfettered 
field, information is readily available for a self-interested and utility-maximizing individuals that 
operate in an environment devoid of uncertainty. In short, neoclassical economics underlies the 
assumption of non-market failure or resorts to the theory of market mechanisms that states the free 
market system dissipates market failure if it arises. Conversely, the theory prescribes a role of 
nightwatchman for the state on the ground that the market is both pervasive and Pareto-efficient 
and increased state intervention creates socially wasteful rent-seeking activities.  
The other basic feature of the neoclassical development model is the assumption that 
economic growth commences with static technology. The acquisition of labor abilities and skills 
as well as the augmentation of higher quality capital that are needed to absorb technology in the 
local market are left to the role of arbitrageurs. Least developed countries are expected to benefit 
from the relative price differential. Resources would move away from advanced countries where 
they are in abundance and therefore their prices are low compared to the least developed countries 
where they are scarce and their prices are higher. Under such likelihood of efficient resource 
allocation across international boundaries, the flow of capital and skilled labor from advanced 
4 
countries to LDCs would fill the gap between the two groups and leads to the famous theory of 
convergence. 
Rwanda is pursuing its own development in order to transform its economy that is 
predominantly dependent on traditional commodity production to an advanced economy by 
investing in the developmental state model. The developmental state model is different from a 
variety of traditional neoclassical models because its tenets do not originate exclusively from the 
historical experiences of western advanced countries. The foundational theory of the 
developmental state model is anchored on national characteristics and particularities of economic 
complexities that it is designed to change. These characteristics and particularities may include 
socioeconomic status, sociocultural aspects, other social norms, institutions and ideologies of an 
individual country. 
The property of the developmental state model is based more on the assumption that it is 
to transform the economy of a less developed country from a subsistence level to an advanced 
level. But, its principles do not subscribe to universal laws of applicability to all countries. It is 
this notion of applicability that distinguishes the developmental state model from neoclassical 
development economics. The ideology of the developmental state is based on the assumption that 
each developing country is beleaguered by distinct and varying degrees of rigidities and market 
failures. The root causes for these problems are embedded into the fabrics of each individual 
country, which in many cases are unique and complicated. 
One of the guiding principles of the developmental state is the realization of the important 
role of sociological, cultural, and other social environments in shaping the goal of economic 
development. These human behaviors connect people together in their communities, regions and 
5 
nations because they are the building blocks for any human ethos and life experiences. At the same 
time, these community members are made up of individuals who are not only self-interested but 
also group associates with non-self-interested behaviors that form the basis of their economic 
system. Such unique blend of economic actors’ self-interested and non-self-interested behaviors, 
values, norms and rules, also known as social capital, underpin their very existence and can be 
understood more effectively by a sociological approach.  The development of social capital on the 
other hand is vital for eliminating economic stagnation and underdevelopment and accelerating 
growth and development. 
Social capital has distinctive properties that makes it stand out from other forms of capital. 
First, it is a public good and has increasing returns to scale. As long as the components that 
comprise social capital exist in the social fabric of society, the benefits obtained by a group of 
individuals from using them do not diminish when other groups also use these same components 
of social capital. That is, the consumption of social capital is non-rivalrous and [non-excludable].   
In the developmental state paradigm, the state plays a crucial role in the creation of social 
capital and in its supply as would be the case for other public goods. Social capital involves 
considerable positive spillovers of benefits or externalities. For that reason, it is undersupplied by 
the market even though it plays a vital role in accelerating economic growth and development. 
Among its attributes are reducing uncertainty and minimizing transaction costs. The state, by the 
virtue of its political power in social capital accumulation can weaken patronage networks and 
promote fairness, equity, as well as enhance participation and democracy to accelerate growth and 
development (Zenawi, 2012, 147). 
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In most cases the private sector does not have an interest in producing public goods because 
of free rider problems. Yet, in order to reduce poverty, increase productivity, promote growth and 
raise development, public goods are vital to developing countries. Investments in health care 
systems, education, access to safe drinking water, hydroelectric power, infrastructure such as roads 
or irrigation systems, etc. are important to improve the quality of life in developing countries. 
Returns on such investments, however, can only be realized in the long-run since these are long-
run projects and extremely expensive to produce. This makes unattractive investement in 
developing countries and even for a well-intentioned domestic or foreign private investor working 
in a well-functioning market pursuing investment in such long-run projects to produce public 
goods in which returns cannot be realized in the short-run. In early developing countries such as 
Rwanda, only the state is a better alternative in the production of public goods.  
One other distinguishing principles of the developmental state is the idea that the state plays 
a crucial role in establishing industrial policies with the specific aim of “improving the 
competitiveness and capabilities of domestic firms and promoting structural transformation” 
(Alice Hoffenberg Amsden, 1992). In the developmental state model, development is defined as a 
transformation and structural change that is permanent and irreversible (Hirschman, 1958; 
Pasinetti, 1993). This puts policies in the forefront to reach the desired objective of economic 
transformation and structural change. In developing countries such as Rwanda where the 
production of agriculture and the informal service sector are used to support human life, only an 
effective developmental state can design measured policies to transform an agrarian mode of 
production to a modern capitalist mode of production. 
The challenge facing developing countries is the lack of functional or sometimes total 
absence of institutions to support economic transformation and structural change. Institutions in 
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areas such as market, education, health, communication channels, transportation, democracy, etc. 
are at their infancy with rudimentary functioning capabilities. To foster industrialization and 
structural change, these and similar institutions must be created and nurtured simultaneously with 
the acquisition of increased technology. With indigenous entrepreneurs and a market system 
operating at a minimum level of efficiency and needing support for their very own existence, to 
exclusively depend on the mechanism of the private sector is far from being an ideal strategy for 
efficient industrialization in early developing countries. 
The other avenue is to faithfully pursue the virtue of international trade to maximizing 
revenue by exclusively relying on primary commodity exports. The rationale of this persuasion 
depends on the assumption that the developing countries have a comparative advantage at 
producing commodities at lower cost than advanced nations. Hence, each of these countries are 
better off specializing in producing only primary commodities to take advantage of their 
comparative advantage. The same principle of comparative advantage purports that industrialized 
countries that are endowed with the ownership of superior technology and skilled-labor force are 
better off specializing in producing only manufacturing goods. In such a static regime of 
international trade theory, developing countries are “forced” to abandon the option of 
manufacturing but are “required” to import to satisfy their need for manufactured goods. However, 
for several decades, the terms of trade between developing countries and advanced countries have 
been continuously declining because of a sustained decrease in the price of commodities and 
sustained increase in the price of manufactured goods. The deterioration of the terms of trade has 
resulted in many dire consequences facing particular African countries such as Rwanda thwarting 
their prospect for catching up with industrialized nations. In other words, the theory of 
international trade of comparative advantage has been far from being a way to maximize the well-
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being of developing countries through the exchange of goods and services but has become an 
injurious conduit to retard the progress of developing countries because of market failure. The 
dependence on primary product exports in the last four decades had several measurable negative 
effects particularly in African countries (Noman & Stiglitz, 2012). First, it limited export variety 
and diversification of exports. Second, it forced African countries to underinvest in domestic 
infrastructure, particularly in agriculture and manufacturing. Third, there was very little domestic 
value added to extracted resources. Fourth, it depleted the continent’s natural resources without 
the benefit of enhancing growth in most countries in Africa. This process is interpreted as a 
replacement of political colonialism by economic colonialism. Fifth, African countries have been 
effectively blocked from industrial capital and real technology transfer. 
In developing countries where market failures are pervasive, indigenous private industries 
are in their embryonic stage and the lack of institutions to overcome poverty traps is immense, 
market solutions are scares and deficient. It is equally clear that the nightwatchman state of 
neoclassical type is neither capable nor has an agenda to overcome the bottleneck of backwardness 
and accelerate development. Thus, the single most important issue of economic development 
cannot be left to the rightful mercies of the market. The appropriate matter then becomes what the 
nature of the developmental state is as the alternative to the neoclassical or neoliberal model of 
development. 
The developmental state must possess certain unique properties to ensure that it can 
overcome deep-rooted and pervasive market failures that create poverty traps and vicious circles 
that have plagued developing countries. There are two components that the literature identifies as 
the main features of the development state that distinguishes it from other states (Zenawi, 2012). 
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First, it must be guided by an ideology that postulates accelerated development as its core mission.  
Second, it must have a structure that empowers it with a capacity to implement policy effectively.  
The ideological nature of the developmental states relies on Alexander Gerschenkron’s 
seminal study of history of industrialization in Europe that shows the more delayed 
industrialization, if it comes, the more explosive the spurt of industrialization (Gerschenkron, 
1962). His conclusion illustrates that when a less developed country embarks on the process of 
economic development, it need not reinvent the wheel because much of the technology required 
for the process will be available. The other advantage for such a country will be avoidance of 
mistakes and the replication of successful experiences in the process of learning from available 
technology. Therefore, despite a heavy burden that requires many resources and time to assimilate 
the already-existing technology, it is more than likely that industrialization takes place at a more 
accelerated pace than early industrialization should it arise. The other reality that late 
industrializers may encounter will be an inexorable undertaking to compete successfully with the 
early industrializers on a level playing field. This may create a legitimate and necessary reason for 
more state intervention concerning the circumstance of late industrialization (Oqubay, 2015). 
If the ideological nature of the developmental state is based on the single-minded pursuit 
of accelerated development, which is the source of its legitimacy, the development project must 
be a hegemonic project in the sense that the key actors voluntarily adhere to its objective and 
principles3. That is, it should maintain control not through violence and political and economic 
coercion, but also through ideology that galvanizes the targeted and strategic section of the public. 
                                                           
3 I discuss hegemony in the Gramscian sense. This is the view that asserts a class cannot dominate in modern 
conditions by merely advancing its own narrow economic interests; neither can it dominate purely through force and 
coercion. Rather, it must exert intellectual and moral leadership, and make alliances and compromises with a variety 
of forces. 
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The second component relates to the structure that the developmental state retains in order 
to have “. . . the capacity to implement policy effectively, which is the result of various political, 
institutional, and technical factors, which in turn are based on the autonomy of the state.” (T. 
Mkandawire, 2001). This autonomy enables the state to pursue its development project without 
succumbing to myopic interests. Developmental state autonomy is qualitatively different from the 
subordinate state whose autonomy is used to maintain corporate coherence and serves the systemic 
interests of market autonomy. In the case of the developmental state, decisions are made 
autonomously based on its developmental agenda, denying the private sector the means to reshape 
them or avoid compliance as they are implemented. On the contrary, the subordinate state decisions 
and their outcomes are the result of the interplay between private-sector pressure and government 
motives and are rarely final (Rodrik, 1992). Hence, the distinction between an autonomous state 
and subordinate state depends on the implementation of policy decisions. The autonomy of the 
developmental state is a source for its ability to make and successfully implement policy despite 
the notion of the private sector. In stark contrast, the subordinate state makes and implements 
decisions by weighing interests of various groups of the private sector. In other words, it is directly 
accountable to these interests.  
It does not imply that the autonomous state would not interact with the private sector and 
take into consideration its response in the process of decision making and implementing it. The 
pivotal role of the autonomous state is that it commands power to use a set of incentives and 
disincentives to guide the process of day-today economic decisions of a market economy that are 
essentially run by the private sector so that it make its decisions in a manner that accelerate 
economic growth. For example, the state can reward growth-enhancing activities and restrict and 
penalize socially wasteful activities to achieve its accelerated growth agenda. “If the state is not 
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autonomous from the private sector, it will not be able to discipline, encourage, and cajole it to act 
in a manner designed by the state.” (Rodrik, 1992). The autonomous state must also get a wide 
range of support for its development agenda. It can achieve this by developing social capital 
through civic engagement in mutually beneficial horizontal networks. Sustenance of a 
development agenda cannot be realized by coercion alone; it must be built on national consensus.  
As stated previously, a developmental state must design strategies to mobilize investments 
in order to provide public goods. In essence, that is what distinguishes the developmental path that 
Rwanda or Burundi undertakes to develop. Chemouni (2016) draws attention to this point by 
highlighting the historical experiences of the nature and role of the two states. He writes that both 
countries “experienced recurrent ethnic violence since independence that culminated in the civil 
war in Burundi (1993 -2003) and the civil war and genocide in Rwanda (1990 – 1994). Their states 
are both headed by liberation movements, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy-
Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) in Burundi, and the Rwanda Patriotic Front 
(RPF) in Rwanda that came to power after a long period of conflict” (Chemouni, 2016). This 
turbulent period caused a serious deterioration of the tax base in both countries. However, in the 
case of Rwanda, the country was able to recover and strengthen its entire tax base after the 
genocide of 1994. For example, in 1997 it developed an effective agency called the Rwanda 
Revenue Authority (RRA) to maximize its tax collection. As a result, the country was able to attain 
15% of GDP revenue collection reaching a standard suggested by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) for low-income countries such as Rwanda during the recovery period after the horrendous 
genocide (UNDP – Rwanda, 2007).  
In order to rebuild the country and improve the standard of living of its people, Rwanda 
needed to mobilize an enormous amount of capital for investment in some critically important 
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sectors such as in healthcare, education, and various infrastructures.  Over the last 15 years the 
country has steadily been increasing both its fiscal revenue and overall government spending. It 
has effectively utilized its RRA policy to augment its capacity of boosting finance from indigenous 
sources with an ultimate goal of financial self-sufficiency and lessening of dependence on foreign 
aid. A large portion of its government budgets have been spent on numerous infrastructure projects 
and poverty reduction programs in order to enhance developmental plans. The government has 
consistently maintained that taxation and public spending are closely linked.   
The country’s budget was supported mainly by foreign aid assistance and only a small 
portion of it came from domestic revenues during the recovery period. In addition, remittance was 
an equally important source of income for several families that improved their ability to pay for 
food, shelter and other essential needs. As the country continued to extract itself from the ghastly 
Genocide of 1994 and its aftermath, the government paid more attention to its development plan 
by making targeted investments in the sectors that it considered to be strategically important to 
stimulate rapid economic growth. Every effort was made to gradually increase agricultural 
products, construct healthcare and educational institutions especially in the rural areas of the 
country where most people live.   The country also expanded capital expenditures notably to build 
physical infrastructures such as airports, railways, roads, in addition to increasing access to clean 
water and sanitation and adding electricity projects. Rwanda’s economic transformation is 
apparent as the country is now engaged in building a new international airport in Bugesera located 
40 kilometers from Kigali, constructing two railways connecting Mombasa-Kampala-Kigali and 
Dares Salaam-Isaka-Kigali, and investing in more constructions of ring roads in the city of Kigali 
and bypass roads in five other important cities. It is worth stating that the government of Rwanda 
has also created a Special Economic Zone in its major city of Kigali and four Industrial Parks in 
13 
four other major cities to achieve its ideology of accelerated economic development in order to 
industrialize the country. 
 More than two-third of the population earn their living from agricultural activities in 
Rwanda. Because of that, the country has been investing considerably in the agriculture sector. 
Most investments have been directed at providing irrigation systems development, water and land 
management, a development of crop diversification and intensification, fix soil erosion, 
conservation and fertility, distribution to farmers of improved and certified seeds, and livestock 
development.4  Policies have been designed and implemented to increase agricultural productivity 
by improving the land reform system, ownership, and efficient use of land and labor in larger 
productive units.  
 The government has also invested heavily in education and health. As a result, more 
schools and hospitals have been built in the post -genocide period, which accounts for the rapid 
economic growth the country has been experiencing.  In the education area, the ministry of 
education created three key agencies: (a) High Education Council (b) Rwanda Education Board 
(REB) and (c) Workforce Development Agency (WDA). The purpose of these agencies was to 
provide guidance and support to all educational systems so that more people are educated at a 
faster growth rate.  In addition, the government reorganized the university system by putting 
together all former seven higher education public schools under one entity. This restructuring 
was intended to improve the quality of education, respond to job market dynamics, exchange 
staff and experts with surrounding regions especially with the Inter-university Council of East 
                                                           
4
 Ministry of Agriculture – Minagri- Rwanda 
www.minagri.gov.rwa 
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Africa.5 In the area of health, Rwanda has done remarkably well in responding to the people’s 
health needs within a short time after the 1994 genocide.  For example, the country provides 
universal health access to all people and communities through a decentralized healthcare public 
service with 400 health posts, 502 health centers, 42 district hospitals, and 5 national hospitals. It 
also has two advanced specialized medical centers, King Faysal Hospital and the University 
Teaching Hospital of Kigali (CHUK) to take care of more complex cases. This universal health 
coverage is built around the concept of a community-based health insurance program (or CBHI) 
and Mutual Health.6  
 
Figure 1: Capital investment (percent of GDP in Rwanda) 
 
Figure 1 shows that the average value of capital investment in Rwanda between 1960 and 
2016 was 14.65% with a minimum of 6.05 percent in 1960 and a maximum of 26.52 percent in 
                                                           
5
 Ministry of Education – Mineduc – Rwanda 
www.mineduc.gov.rwa 
6
 Ministry of Health -MoH -Rwanda 
www.moh.gov.rwa 
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2013. This figure also highlights how government expenditure investment remains steady around 
15% on average before the genocide, went down in 1994, and finally restarted to increase 
gradually around 2000 in Rwanda reaching a maximum in 2013. 
 
  
Figure 2: Government expenditure growth rate and GDP growth rate in Rwanda 
 
Figure 2 shows the government expenditure growth rate (GEGR) and GDP growth rate 
(GEGR) in Rwanda from 2004 to 2014. The data is only from 2004 to 2014. We observe here 
that the government expenditure growth rate is on average, higher than the GDP growth rate. The 
trend of the government expenditure is relatively positive compared to the GDP that remains 
steady around 10 percent during this period. The government of Rwanda increased its spending, 
but did not significantly affect economic growth. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of public spending in selected sectors in Rwanda7 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of public spending in certain important sectors in 
Rwanda. There is a comparison of public expenditure among some important sectors such as 
education, agriculture, health, sports, and culture. This figure also indicates that on average most, 
if not all trends are positive except in education when at once it was positive and then turned 
negative between 2010 and 2014.  We clearly see the trend of infrastructure is positive and 
higher than in other sectors. We understand that Rwanda spends and values more infrastructures 
among other important sectors such as education, agriculture, and health. Indeed, Rwanda is 
investing very much in infrastructures because they are very important to achieve economic 
development. Infrastructure allows all economic networks to connect and assure the mobility of 
productive resources. It is important for people and for the distribution of goods and services in 
the country. 
                                                           
7
 Ochieng, Amos et al.”Effect of Government Expenditure on Economic Growth in Rwanda (2005 – 2015)” 
International Journal of Economics, Commerce, and Management. 
October 2017.  
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Figure 4:  Burundi – Capital investment as percent of GDP 
 
Figure 4 indicates that the average value of capital investment in Burundi from 1960 to 
2016 was 12.82 percent with a minumum of 2.78 percent in 2000 and a maximum of 30.52 
percent. In comparison to Rwanda, this figure also shows that capital investment in Burundi was 
slightly higher from 2008 to 2014. However, the difference on average in capital investment as 
percent of GDP between Burundi and Rwanda is not significant, even though it remains higher in 
Rwanda. 
This predicts that Burundi could spend more resources in terms of contribution to GDP in 
building infrastructures. Although it has huge potential, the government of Burundi has not 
invested much of all the allocated resources in the key sectors of infrastructure, agriculture, 
education, health, and tourism like her neighboring sister country Rwanda. Resources were not 
used efficiently because of rent-seeking and corruption. Money was just consumed and spent in 
other non-developmental projects. Burundi’s government investment is least efficient than in 
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Rwanda and needs to be improved. There is a large infrastructure gap between Rwanda and 
Burundi. It is worth noting here that capital expenditure in Burundi is a shared responsibility 
between the government through its ministries and agencies and all other donors from 
international organizations. This mechanism does not help much to make the execution rate of 
investment expenditure more effective.  
Table 1. Development Expenditures for Core Infrastructure Program (US$ millions at 2007 
constant prices)8 
 
Table 1 shows the sectors in which Burundi plan to invest to build its fundamental 
economic infrastructures between 2010 and 2030. To reduce the shortage of infrastructure, since 
2017 the government of Burundi launched an Infrastructure Action Plan over twenty years (2010 
– 2030) requiring $5.8 billion to catch up with other neighboring countries especially in the key 
sectors of energy, transport, and telecommunications. This program plans to bring new business 
opportunities to Burundi.9 In fact, Rwanda and Burundi depend heavily on the two larger and 
                                                           
8
 African Development Bank. An Infrastructure Action Plan for Burundi Accelerating Regional Integration. 
September 2009 
9
 African Development Bank. An Infrastructure Action Plan for Burundi. Accelerating Regional Integration, 2009.  
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important international ports in East Africa Mombasa (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) 
especially for their export product such as coffee, tea, and minerals. While Rwanda already 
started building both railways to Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, Burundi still lags behind at their 
feasibility studies and is still looking for resources to finance this most expensive infrastructure 
among various projects.  In addition, the international airport in Burundi needs to be expanded 
and modernized to attract more airlines and freight companies from the world. Burundi also 
needs the same productive economic infrastructures as Rwanda. However, Burundi has not yet 
started to invest in key developmental projects such as airports, railways, roads like in Rwanda to 
improve access to local and international markets. Furthermore, Burundi possesses a large 
reserve of minerals such as nickel, coltan, and bauxite.  Therefore, the government of Burundi 
has identified agricultural and industrial exploitation of nickel to accelerate economic growth and 
reduce poverty when productive infrastructure is completed and effective.10 
It is important to mention that capital expenditures expand between 10 and 28 percent of 
GDP from 2004 to 2014 in Burundi and these investments benefited largely the sectors of 
education, health, and productive infrastructure. Every time there is an increase of investments in 
social sectors, foreign donors are at the source and responsible. To generate and then sustain 
rapid economic growth necessary to reduce poverty and develop, Burundi should first reduce the 
deficiencies in physical infrastructures and invest then massively and efficiently in the sectors of 
agriculture, education, health, tourism, water, and mining. 
                                                           
10
 An Infrastructure Action Plan for Burundi. Accelerating Regional Integration 2009. African Development Bank 
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Figure 5: Share of Budget Allocations to the Ministry of Health (%)11 
Figure 5 shows how the government of Burundi had already been struggling to contribute 
at least 15% of GDP in health expenditures as required by the Abuja declaration12 in 2001 before 
it committed to invest in grandiose expensive infrastructural projects over 20 years. 
Let us now find when Rwanda started to implement the developmental state strategy to 
seek its economic development. Just after the genocide in 1994, Rwanda started a period of 
recovery which lasted almost 5 years from 1994 to 1999, and the government of Rwanda had 
been led by a Hutu Pasteur Bizimungu, who was at once president of the country and chairman 
of the RPF party. Under his supervision, Rwanda organized an initial national dialogue called 
Urugwiro Village and then in 2012, organized the Umushyikirano (Dialogue National Counsel) 
to think and design a developmental agenda to improve the standard of living of people and 
achieve economic development (Obidegwu, 2003). It was during the first dialogue that the 
project of choosing the developmental state economic model as a systematic way to achieve 
economic development had been initiated and elaborated, which itself is patterned after the 
Singapore model. The main goal of the government of Rwanda was to transform Rwanda to look 
like Singapore. Ayittey (2017) criticizes this very strong assumption in his study on Rwanda. He 
                                                           
11
 Budget Brief: The 2017 Health Sector Budget- Burundi 
12
 In 2001, leaders of African countries met in Abuja (Nigeria) and decided to commit to invest at least 15 % of the 
GDP every year to the health sector. 
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argues that “the Asian Tiger economic model Rwanda copied from Singapore-development 
under authoritarianism—has failed miserably in postcolonial Africa. No dictator—civilian, 
military nor rebel—has brought lasting prosperity to any African country” (Ayittey, 2017). 
Additionally, with the aim of fighting poverty, Rwanda with the assistance of United 
Nations (UN) experts developed programs such as the Economic Development and Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (1 & 2) (Ansoms & Rostagno, 2012, 9–10; UNDP (Rwanda), 2007,  65–66), 
in which it has clearly showed its preoccupation to implement the developmental state model to 
succeed. Furthermore, in Rwanda Vision 2020, the government of Rwanda put in place a long-
term developmental plan to accelerate social and economic progress, which inevitably will 
improve the people’s quality of life.  
The empirical focus of this research is on two small, resource-poor, and landlocked 
countries, Rwanda and Burundi located in the region of the Great Lakes in Central Africa. 
Rwanda and Burundi can be considered very populous compared to the size of their land in 
regard to their higher population density. These two countries could be just one because they are 
fairly similar in terms of size, languages (Kinyarwanda, Kirundi, Swahili), and ethnic group 
configurations such as 84% Hutus, 15% Tutsis, and 1% Twa. They also share the same colonial 
history and were colonized first by Germany, which lost control of these colonies after losing to 
Belgium during World War One, and then became independent countries from Belgium in 1962. 
Rwanda and Burundi went through several cycles of violence and political conflicts 
between the two major ethnic groups Hutus and Tutsis that was initiated during the Belgian 
colonial occupation. These violent and continued conflicts were characterized by massacres, 
assassinations, and forced migrations to neighboring countries. In Rwanda, Tutsis have been 
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massacred by Hutus in 1959, 1973 and 1994. Similarly, Burundi also suffered a series of ethnic 
violence. The only difference was the culprits were the Tutsis and the victims were the Hutus. 
Over 300, 000 Hutus were massacred by the Tutsis military government in 1972. The most tragic 
one was the 1994 massacre of nearly one million Tutsis at the hand of extremist Hutus in 
Rwanda.  That catastrophe had immeasurable calamity on the Rwandan economy. As a matter of 
fact, on April 6, 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, Juvenal Habyarimana and Cyprien 
Ntaryamira were killed together after their airplane returning from negotiation with Tutsis Rebels 
in Tanzania crashed near Kigali International Airport and fell inside the presidential palace. This 
event is considered as a starting point of the genocide in Rwanda, which lasted three months, and 
stopped on July 7, 1994, by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) led by General Paul Kagame. To 
avenge the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana, attributed to Tutsis, extremist 
members of the Hutu ethnic majority killed at least 800,000 people mostly Tutsis and moderate 
Hutus. It is worth noting that all violence stopped in Rwanda after the RPF seized power and 
successfully controlled the entire country, meanwhile Burundi continued to experience mass 
killing and political instability until 2003. Rwanda and Burundi are now using two different 
economic models of the capitalist system and as a result they have divergent economic 
outcomes. The main question is which one of these two economic models works better in the 
context of Africa to promote economic development. 
In this thesis, I examine the efficacy of the developmental state model using data from 
Rwanda and Burundi in applying the standard method of difference-in-difference to compare 
both countries Rwanda and Burundi in order to contrast their two different models of 
development. In fact, I use Burundi as a control country and the treatment country is Rwanda. In 
this regard, the treatment simply consists of the application of the developmental state 
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framework in Rwanda after the genocide in 1994. The time is divided in two periods, before and 
after the genocide in 1994 of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, to which the limit is 1994. The purpose 
of this research is to find the source of difference on the path of sustained, rapid growth and the 
way to development for both countries although they are almost identical and have numerous 
similarities. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II the review of the literature is presented. 
Section III focuses on the source of data. Section IV is devoted to the discussion of the standard 
method of difference-in-differences. Section V focuses on the Empirical results of the data. 
Whereas the final section VI is on the conclusive remarks about the thesis. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The literature on the developmental state is at its infancy despite the fact that the single 
most important facilitator of industrialization in all late industrialized economies has been the 
developmental state. It is only in the last four decades since the concept of the developmental 
state has been included in the lexicon of literature. Johnson (1982) was the first scholar who 
introduced the idea of the developmental state. He coined the term developmental state to point 
out the significant role that the Japanese government had during its industrialization as the first 
late industrialized country that achieved a remarkable development at an accelerated speed 
relative to the earlier industrialized Western countries (Öniş, 1991).  
Amsden (1992) who studied more carefully the extent of state intervention during South 
Korean industrialization also enriched the developmental state literature. She examined the 
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importance of a series of measures that the South Korean government employed in order to 
accelerate growth. These measures included subsidies and regulations to nurture and protect the 
development of infant industries, tax-breaks and other forms of incentives to attract more inward 
foreign direct investments, acquisition of technology, creative ways of transforming rent-seeking 
into rent-creation, instituting special rules of the game in order to control and discipline the 
market as well as reduce corruption. The combined works of Johnson and Amsden were the 
earliest that illustrated the ideology and structure of the developmental state based on their 
studies of the Japanese and South Korean industrialization experiences. They highlighted the 
crucial role of the developmental state in formulating sound industrial and trade policies, such as 
utilizing the merits of dynamic comparative advantage for industrialization purpose as an 
alternative to static comparative advantage, and the acquisition of foreign technology to support 
the acceleration of development. 
Other authors include  Zenawi (2012) and  Oqubay  (2015) who persuasively argued 
about the vital role of state policy to enhance rapid economic progress based on their studies of 
Ethiopia’s economic accomplishment in the last two decades.  Zenawi reinforced the important 
role of state policy that improves agricultural productivity and direct the obtained surplus to 
generate industrialization. Oqubay presented detailed empirical analysis of industrial policy 
using the experience of Ethiopia. 
The vital role of the developmental state model to stimulate dynamic transformation and 
achieve a full-fledged industrialization in the least developed economies has been supported by 
several more authors.  For example,  Mkandawire (2012),  Kauzya (2005), Peter Evans (2012), 
Tshilidzi Marwala (2009) have provided further details on the centrality of state policies to kick 
start investment in higher education without which the success of transfer of technology cannot 
25 
be realized. These authors also demonstrated the distinct role of state policy that enabled and 
galvanized people to fully participate in the structural transformation of the later industrialized 
Asian countries.  Similarly, Mkandawire (2012) provided detailed insights underlying the virtues 
of the developmental state that accelerates economic growth by mobilizing civil societies, 
marshaling bureaucratic capabilities and deploying its authoritative power to overcome the 
inefficiencies of disorganization that are widespread in LDCs. The other important contribution 
of Mkandawire and Zenawi is their enlightening analysis on the key role that social capital 
brings in order to achieve economic development. They elucidated on the strong link between 
social capital and economic development because of its distinguishing public good feature that 
only state policy is suited to provide. 
One characteristic of the developmental state is the need to mobilize and create a 
conducive condition for full participation of the entire population if economic development is to 
succeed. This idea of the developmental state was brought to attention by Peter Evans (2012) and 
John Mary Kauzya (2005) in their respective studies of education and human capital. The 
developmental state model in theory and practice, they noted, have shown both the commitment 
and the ability to establish access to public education at all levels for all as the precondition for 
active participation of citizens. Johnson (1982) and Amsden (1992) in their illuminating studies 
of Japanese and South Korean industrialization, also reiterated the indispensable significance of 
the best talent and professional, knowledgeable, competent and motivated public service leaders 
and private entrepreneurs to consummate the process of industrialization.  
Other studies focus on the process of how decisions are made to advance developmental 
agendas by the developmental state. In this regard, Zenawi (2012) and Rodrik (1992) identify 
one of the qualities of the developmental state and its status of autonomy that differentiates it 
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from the run-of-the-mill state and empowers it to implement policy effectively. They assert that 
the developmental state is able to pursue the developmental project without succumbing to 
myopic interests due to its autonomous status. Stiglitz (2012) also contends that the 
developmental state is capable of disciplining the market to avoid market failures that is 
pervasive in the least developed economies because its autonomous status lends legitimacy to its 
policy. Zenawi underscores that the basic characteristics of the developmental state that can be 
described as the single-minded pursuit of accelerated development can only be achieved in part 
due to its autonomous nature. While Peter Evans (2012) stresses the fact that without autonomy, 
the characteristics of the business community cannot be reshaped by state policy. 
Some authors highlight the successful practice of the developmental state in utilizing its 
policy to create a diversified business conglomerate or a multi-industry company in order to 
develop a strong private sector. For instance, Johnson (1982) and Amsden (2001) point at the 
vital role of Zaibatsu and Keietsu in Japan and Chaebol in South Korea that were instrumental in 
achieving economic progress in both countries during their industrialization. According to 
Johnson, the creation of such conglomerates had served to speed up Japanese industrialization by 
facilitating partnerships and collaborations between the private sectors and the public sectors. 
Similarly, Amsden details the way Chaebol has been serving as corner stones to complete the 
Korean economic transformation from its medieval society to advanced society by utilizing the 
state-corporate alliance. In the case of Rwanda, the study by Golooba-Mutebi Frederick (2008) 
shows that the government has invested in the creation of a diversified business group, called 
Tri-Star/CVL, to reduce problems of market failures, manage externalities and deal with 
technology procurement. The ultimate objective is that the partnerships and collaborations of the 
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state and the private sector produce sustainable economic growth resulting in complete 
industrialization.  
Another central feature of the developmental state is its conceptualization of the reality of 
deep-rooted and pervasive market failures and the commitment that it brings to eliminate or 
minimize their effects in hindering economic progress in less developed economies. According 
to Zenawi  (2012) it is the existence of market failures that provide sound theoretical explanation 
for active state policy in the late industrializing economies.  He states that market failures in 
developing economies obstruct access to some critical necessities most needed for development 
in such areas as education, health care systems, infrastructures, technology and especially in the 
development of national capitalists and industries. He argues that the private market in 
developing economies cannot provide the necessary economic fundamentals and ensure efficient 
outcomes, but only non-market interventions are capable to deliver them to society and bring 
about more efficient outcomes. Alluding to this point, Stiglitz (1989) states that given the 
pervasive market failures that are too common in less developed countries, only non-market 
interventions can alter the exclusionary characteristic of these types of necessities that normally 
exist in the domain of the private sector to the non-exclusionary characteristic in the domain of 
the public sector.  
In the case of Africa, the dearth of studies on the developmental state is even more acute. 
The few studies that paid attention on this issue focused either on analyses that assess the 
advantage and disadvantage of the developmental state for African countries or explain 
similarities and differences between developmental states in East Asian countries and African 
countries. Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor (2005) whose study is considered a pioneering work 
for the case of African countries, concentrated on the implications of the developmental state 
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economic model in African countries. Their research was based on the assessment of 
developmental experiences of two countries, Botswana and Uganda. The two countries are 
among very few African countries that are using the developmental state economic model to 
achieve developmental objectives. While Mbabazi and Taylor recognize the importance of the 
developmental state in African countries to promote and accelerate development, they also 
underline that the developmental state model designed and implemented in Botswana and 
Uganda was different from the East Asian countries because of the historical context and human 
capabilities differences. They also noted that Botswana has achieved remarkable economic 
successes compared to Uganda. Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba (2010) also contributed to 
our understanding of the value of the developmental state model for development in African 
countries. In their study, they presented detailed analysis explicating the economic success of 
Botswana and Mauritius due in part to active state interventions, which created access to health 
care, education, safe drinking water transportation, etc. that are essential elements for the quality 
of life and to reduce poverty, increase productivity and promote growth and sustain 
development.  
Meles (2012) and Mkandawire (2012) introduced the concept of a democratic 
developmental state and provided conceptual underpinnings to its relevance and applicability as 
the best alternative model for African countries. They argued that in East Asian countries where 
the spectacular success of the developmental state has become its reference point, their socio-
economic basis and the makeup of their people are quite different from most African countries. 
African countries are ethnically and culturally more diverse in contrast to the homogeneous 
ethnic groups in most East Asian countries. The underlying political, economic and institutional 
factors that can support the development process are also distinct between the two regions. 
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According to Zenawi and Mkandawire, given the heterogeneous character of African countries, 
only the democratic developmental state can pursue a national policy in which the freedom of all 
citizens without limitations can be unleashed to transform the less developed economy into a 
more advanced economy. Another novel contribution on the topic of late industrialization in 
general and the Ethiopian case in particular is the work of  Oqubay (2015). Oqubay thoroughly 
examines conventional views and contemporary debates on issues of industrial policy. In 
addition, his study is the first of its kind that blends theory and practice to elucidate the industrial 
policy process of an African country that uses the developmental state model to industrialize. 
As stated in the introduction section, this thesis uses the estimation procedure of 
difference-in-difference (Vicente, 2010) to study the economic performance in Rwanda and 
Burundi based on empirical analysis.  The main motivation of the thesis is to explore the relative 
importance of developmental state model in African countries by studying the experiences of 
Rwanda and Burundi. These two countries provide a unique opportunity to contrast the standard 
growth model with the developmental state model. Although these countries historically shared 
much political, economic, cultural and institutional structures, after the 1994 genocide, they do 
not have the same nature of state, political leadership, and more importantly, they use different 
economic models to reduce poverty, accelerate growth, and achieve economic development. In 
other words, the two countries that used to have almost identical socio-economic and cultural 
heritage before the genocide, but have embraced two distinct models to attain advanced 
industrialization. To my knowledge, all previous studies about the developmental state in African 
countries are based on theoretical scrutiny. Hence, there is a lack of empirical analysis to support 
the role of the developmental state with empirical evidence. This thesis attempts to contribute to 
this gap in the literature. In contrast, none of the earlier studies have compared two countries 
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with two distinct economic models to examine the level of their economic performances, 
especially among African countries. More specifically, my thesis is to learn whether the 
developmental state model is a more suited alternative economic model to the standard 
neoclassical model for African countries based on the empirical study of Rwanda and Burundi’s 
economies. 
 
III. Section 3: Data 
 
This study uses annual data covering the period 1974-2014. Since the annual data covers 
a period of 40 years, we shall be able to check whether a common trend existed before the 
developmental state economic model was implemented in Rwanda, and analyze the differences 
that came about after the intervention in Rwanda. The data used in this study is an annual panel 
dataset covering 1974 to 2014 because of the absence of quarterly data for both countries Rwanda and 
Burundi. Thus, the dataset contains 41 annual observations for each country. 
The dataset is composed of 11 variables representing monetary and non-monetary social 
and economic indicators. The eight monetary variables used to conduct this empirical research 
were gross domestic product (GDP); GDP per capita; GDP growth rate; Real services, etc., value 
added; Real exports of goods and services; Real industry, value added; Real manufacturing, 
value-added, and Real agriculture, value added. GDP and GDP per capita are measured in 
national currency (Rwanda and Burundi Francs) and all other monetary variables are measured 
in terms of percentage of GDP. 
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This list of variables is not exhaustive. As mentioned, the dataset also includes non -
monetary variables such as Life expectancy at birth (years), Children under-five deaths 
(persons), and Human capital index. In addition, we created seven independent variables to allow 
us to estimate our difference-in-differences model: Treated, After, Treated x After, Time, Time2, 
Treated x Time, and Treaded x Time2. Treated is defined as an indicator variable taking a 1 for 
Rwanda, which receives the “treatment” after 1994, and a 0 for Burundi, which serves as our 
“untreated” comparison country. In addition, After is defined as an indicator variable taking a 1 
for all years after 1994 and a 0 before that period. Treated × After is the interaction term between 
the Treatment and After indicator variables that helps to capture the difference-in- differences in 
the outcomes between these two countries before and after 1994. Time is defined as the years of 
observations, which is divided in two time periods (0,1). Period 0 indicates a time period before 
the treatment (pre-treatment period) and period 1 indicates a time period after the treatment took 
place (post-treatment period). Timesquared expressed an indicator variable that multiply time by 
time to enlarge time after 41 years. Finally, Treated × Time and Treated ×Timesquared are 
defined as indicator variables to measure the effect of the change for each country in specific 
time. This is further described in the methodology section. 
Moreover, data is divided into two periods — before and after 1994. The before period 
covers the years 1974 to 1994 and the after period covers the remaining years from 1994 to 2014. 
The year 1994 is always represented on the graph by a vertical line to separate the periods. The 
reasons for choosing this year is simple. First, 1994 is the year of the horrific genocide of Tutsis, 
where near one million people were killed in three months. Second, the same year (on April 6) 
the two Hutus presidents from Rwanda and Burundi were killed. Third, 1994 represents the 
change of regime when the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) led by General Paul Kagame, the 
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current Rwanda President RPF, seized power in Rwanda after having stopped the genocide. And 
finally, for practical reasons, the specificity of the period helps to scope the boundaries of this 
study. With this separation and a balanced panel of data with paired observations for both 
countries over the period 1974-2014, we are able to show the parallel trends between Rwanda 
and Burundi over 20 years before the genocide when these two countries mainly applied 
neoclassical economic principles and followed the Washington Consensus policies to seek 
economic development. Then, we are able to look at 20 years after the genocide to capture the 
difference between the two countries while Rwanda switched to a developmental state economic 
model. In this regard, this data should help to estimate exactly the difference in the economic 
outcomes and social development between Rwanda and Burundi that lead us to better understand 
the impact of the development state framework. 
 
IV. Methodology 
 
In this study, we applied the standard method of difference-in-differences to evaluate the 
effect of the developmental state economic model on the economy of Rwanda by comparing its 
economic successes with the economy of Burundi, which uses a different model of development. 
The case study of Rwanda and Burundi is a natural experiment because these two countries show 
real world conditions that approximate what would have happened in a randomized controlled 
experiment, which motivate us to examine their levels of development. The current situation 
between these two countries Rwanda and Burundi should help to capture the effect of the 
different systems of government and policy changes on their economic growth and development. 
33 
The context between Rwanda and Burundi arises without our interference and the treatment 
appears as if it were randomly assigned (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2010). 
Furthermore, randomized controlled experiments are rare in economics. Natural 
experiments differs from randomized controlled experiments because  natural experiments are 
not consciously designed by the researcher (Hill et al., 2010). Notably, Card and Krueger (1993) 
rely on a natural experiment and use the differences-in-differences method to study the effect of 
an increase of minimum wage on employment at fast food restaurants in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania. In the African context, probably the most noted and affective difference-in-
differences analysis example is the study by Vicente  (2010), who uses a natural experiment to 
compare Sao Tome and Principe to Cape Verde to explore the impact of an oil discovery 
announcement on corruption (Vicente, 2010).  
From the same perspective, we examine the treatment effects of the developmental state 
between  Rwanda, which uses a developmental state economic model and Burundi, which 
maintains the status quo and is theoretically unaffected by the economic model change in 
Rwanda. The case study of Rwanda and Burundi is a natural experiment because these two 
countries are comparable and sorted into something like a control and treatment group. Of 
course, the fact that Rwanda uses currently a developmental state economic model and Burundi 
continues with the principles of neoclassical economics is not under our control. Therefore, we 
understand that this exposure can be recognized as a natural experiment. In other words, the case 
of Rwanda and Burundi also serves well as a natural experiment in which these two countries are 
exposed to the experimental and control conditions that have been created by their political 
leadership respectively and induced by policy changes. The key identifying assumptions of the 
difference-in-differences model as related to determining the impact of the developmental state 
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model in Rwanda is that, in the absence of treatment, that the underlying trends would have 
remained unchanged and any unobserved differences between Rwanda and Burundi would have 
been the same over time. 
 To this end, we show the Parallel trends assumption between Rwanda and Burundi 
before the genocide from 1974 -1994 and identify the differences after the genocide of 1994. The 
parallel trends assumption requires that the trend in the outcome variable for both treatment and 
control countries before the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda (1974 – 1994) to be similar. One of the 
most common problems with difference-in-differences method is the failure of the common trend 
assumption. To avoid this problem, David Albouy suggested collecting more data on other time 
periods before and after treatment to see if there are any other pre-existing differences in trends 
(Albouy, 2004).  
A vital driver for success in the developmental state economic model is industrialization. 
For this precise reason, we will focus more attention in the interpretation of difference-in-
differences coefficients of the variables such as GDP, GDP growth rate, GDP per capita, Human 
capital index, Services, Exports, Agriculture, Industry, Manufacturing, and Agriculture between 
both countries. 
The framework of the developmental state economic model in Rwanda (Yi) is modeled by the 
following equation:   
Yit = β0 + β1Treatedit + β2Afterit + β3Treated x Afterit + εit                             (EQ1) 
     Yit = β0 + β1Tit + β2Ait + β3TitAit + εit 
Rwanda implements a change in their economic model to reduce poverty, sustain economic 
growth, and promote development. The outcome variable, Yit, represents factors believed to be 
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tied to economic growth due to economic reforms from the developmental state strategy. By 
using the standard method of difference-in-differences. In this equation Treatedit   and Afterit are 
the aforementioned indicator variables. εit is a random unobserved error term which contains all 
other variables correlated with Yit  omitted in the model. We do not know at this time if the error 
term εi t is actually unbiased error term; if there are other factors that affect the difference in 
trends between the two countries, Rwanda and Burundi, then the estimation of the impact of the 
development state economic framework in Rwanda will be biased. Our model also contains the 
subscripts i and t, in which i represents country, where i = 0,1 (i = 0 for Burundi and i = 1 for 
Rwanda) and t stands for time period, where t = 1….41. 
 Given this model, β0 is the outcome in Burundi before the genocide, β1 is the difference 
in outcome in Rwanda relative to Burundi before the genocide, β2 is difference in outcomes in 
Burundi after the genocide compared to before the genocide, and β3 is the difference-in-
differences estimate, which is calculated as: 
β3 = (outcome in Rwanda after the genocide –outcome in Rwanda before the genocide) – 
(outcome in Burundi after the genocide – outcome in Burundi before the genocide).  
As robustness checks in additional specification we include in the model (1) a linear time 
trend common to both countries, (2) a quadratic time trend common to both countries, (3) time 
fixed effects common to both countries, (4) a linear time trend specific to each country, (5) a 
quadratic time trend common to each country, or (6) time fixed effects specific to each country.  
In addition, we use both Moulton and two-way cluster robust standard errors clustered on 
country and year to adjust standard error coefficients to avoid problems related to autocorrelation 
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and heteroskedasticity.13 Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainahan found after analyzing several articles 
on difference-in-differences that the use of fewer states and time periods is the main cause of 
serial correlation problems. There exist many solutions to adjust standard errors, such as using 
Moulton and two-way cluster robust methods (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004), which 
we implement here.  
 Using Moulton standard errors, we remark that all coefficients in the time fixed effects 
regression are identical to those in the basic regression. However, we obtained slightly different 
estimates for both β0 and β2 when we regress our data using two-way cluster robust standard 
errors. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
Over the last two decades, economic performances in Rwanda have been remarkable. 
Therefore, we would like to know whether the developmental state economic model 
implemented in Rwanda around years 1994-1998 is at the source of its economic development 
miracle. This comparative analysis between Rwanda and Burundi that used difference-in-
differences method is based on 11 important variables from our dataset such as gross domestic 
product (GDP), GDP per capita measured in national currency (Rwanda and Burundi Francs), 
and  GDP growth rate to name just a few. Real services, value added, Real exports of goods and 
services, Real industry, value added, Real manufacturing, value-added, and Real agriculture, 
                                                           
13
 Brigham R. Frandsen. Moulton, BRL_Moulton.zip 
  https://economics.byu.edu/frandsen/Pages/Software.aspx 
Stata: net search vce2way 
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value added, Life expectancy at birth, Children under-five deaths, and the Human capital index. 
In the first step of this comparative study between Rwanda and Burundi, we regress these eleven 
dependent variables on seven independent indicator variables as control, and generated figures 
and tables to store their coefficients and standard errors.  
Secondly, we also have performed robustness checks with this dataset and decided to 
remove three years for each country around 1994, especially the year before- and after the 
genocide to avoid the deep negative shock. Consequently, from the 82 observations that we had 
at first, after dropping 6 observations, which correspond exactly to three years 1993, 1995, and 
1994 we end up with 76 observations in total for our final data analysis. None of these altered 
our coefficients. However, some coefficients increased,, and standard errors were adjusted. Most 
of our empirical analyses in this section will focus on comparing the post-genocide period with 
the pre-genocide period between Rwanda and Burundi for each dependent variable. Controls are 
the same in all regression equations of our model. Standard errors are clustered by Moulton and 
Vce2way at the country level and year. As already mentioned above, the main estimator is 
β3TitAit, which capture exactly the differences-in-differences between Rwanda and Burundi 
before and after the genocide of 1994. In order to check for the specification between both 
countries and year, which is exactly the specific country by year fixed effects, we 
correspondingly add a dummy variable TitTime in EQ5 and EQ6 to consolidate our findings.  
The real gross domestic product (GDP) is the best way and most accurate measure 
ofeconomic growth. It also remains the most important economic indicator to measure 
productivity of a country. Economic growth also can be used to judge and appreciate the 
effectiveness of a state like in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. Indeed, economic growth is 
fundamental, necessary, indispensable, but not sufficient to achieve economic development. To 
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sustain economic growth, other important dimensions are needed. Another measure of economic 
growth is GDP per capita. Let us now compare the GDP and GDP per capita to find out what 
country performs better and to know how large the difference in economic outcomes between 
Rwanda and Burundi is. 
 
 
Figure 6. Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in National Currency (Billions) 
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Table 2: Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Real GDP. 
Y variable: Real GDP in National Currency (Billions) in Burundi and Rwanda  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 23.441 .483 22.654 24.724 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5) Time F.E. (5)Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .445*** 
(.011)14 
[.094] 
.445 
(.008) 
[.047] 
.445 
(.001) 
[.043] 
.445*** 
(.031) 
[.094] 
-33.274*** 
(8.434) 
[11.329] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .162*** 
(.048) 
[.094] 
-.829 
(.182) 
[.081] 
-.829 
(.185) 
[.075] 
.82515*** 
(.041) 
.16216 
[.123] 
 
-.642*** 
(.047) 
[.099] 
-.639*** 
(.057) 
[.091] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.411*** 
(.02) 
[.134] 
.411 
(.034) 
[.066] 
.411 
(.043) 
[.061] 
.411*** 
(.074) 
[.134] 
.037 
(.115) 
[.140] 
.031 
(.135) 
[.128] 
 
TIME  .045 
(.008) 
[.003] 
-1.717 
(2.240) 
[.494] 
 .037 
(.002) 
[.004] 
-1.709 
(2.258) 
[.462] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .0004 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
  .0004 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    .017 
(.004) 
[.006] 
-.017 
(.005) 
[.005] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     .000 
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 23.034 
(.027) 
[.067] 
-66.283 
(16.617) 
[5.97] 
1690.789 
(2225.095) 
[491.993] 
22.87117 
(.256) 
23.03418 
(.087) 
-49.424 
(3.442) 
[8.011] 
1691.012 
(2251.128) 
[460.302] 
R-Squared 0.65 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.94 
                                                           
14
 Numbers in ( ) are standard errors from vce2way regression and [ ]  contain standard errors of  Moulton estimate 
regression clustered at the country and time levels 
15
 Vce2 way regression with fixed time effects for After coefficient 
16
 Moulton regression with fixed time effects coefficient After coefficient  
All coefficients have been rounded to 3 decimal places 
*** indicates that a coefficient is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
**significant at the 5 percent level.   
17 Vce2way regression with fixed time effects for constant coefficient 
18 Moulton regression with fixed time effects for constant coefficient 
Linear and Quadratic Regressions served to check for country specific by year fixed effects in EQ5 and EQ6 (cst). 
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For this regression, the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= .411, p= 0.000) for Real Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) in National Currency (Billions) is significant and positive. Results are 
shown in Table 2 and Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5. It captures the difference in real Gross Domestic 
Product in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 compared to before the genocide period. This 
coefficient indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda we can expect natural log of real 
Gross Domestic Product to increase by an average 41.1 percent when Rwanda started using the 
developmental state economic model. The sign of β3 is positive as expected and it is statistically 
significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The standard error of the β3TitAit coefficient is 
smaller than that of β2Ait. Therefore, this model is able to estimate the coefficient β3TitAit with 
greater precision. Moreover, Treated ×Time is the coefficient that shows the difference in real 
Gross Domestic Product between Rwanda and Burundi over 40 years before and after the 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994 with and without treatment. Columns 6 and 7 of table 2 show that 
when we added Time, Treated ×Time, Timesquared, and Treated × Timesquared in the model 
equation to check for the country specific by year time effects, the coefficient β3TitAit decreases, 
remains positive and fluctuates between .037 and .031 in the two equations EQ5 and EQ6. The 
sign of β3 stays positive as expected and statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% 
level. Let us now examine the output results of the dependent variable, the GDP growth rate, 
between Rwanda and Burundi.  
The difference between the coefficient estimates on the dependent variable real GDP for 
both countries are consistent and statistically significant across all columns. Overall, the results 
show that the economic growth differences between Rwanda and Burundi are substantial. After 
having analyzed the GDP for both countries, it is time to examine the dependent variables of 
GDP growth rate and real GDP per capita. The R-squared is 0.6520, which means that 
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approximately 65% of the variability of total real Gross Domestic Product, National Currency 
(real GDP) is accounted for by the model related to Rwanda and Burundi. 
 
 
Figure 7. GDP growth rate 
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Table 3:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on GDP growth 
rate.  
Y variable: Gross Domestic Product growth rate  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 4.612 4.755 -8 19.5 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5) Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .133 
(.253) 
[1.384) 
.133 
(.232) 
[1.391] 
.133 
(.219) 
[1.386] 
.133 
(1.55) 
[1.384] 
1031.258*** 
(19.079) 
[336.845] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER -1.487*** 
(.274) 
[1.384] 
-.465 
(5.773) 
[2.416] 
-.465 
(5.796) 
[2.407] 
2.524 
(4.045) 
-1.487  
[1.43] 
-6.185*** 
(.486) 
[2.952] 
 
-6.193*** 
(.820) 
[2.935] 
 
 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
5.892*** 
(.310) 
[1.957] 
5.892*** 
(.253) 
[1.967] 
5.892*** 
(.321) 
[1.959] 
5.892*** 
(1.942) 
[1.957] 
17.332*** 
(1.068) 
[4.175] 
17.349*** 
(1.368) 
[4.151] 
 
TIME  -.047 
(.266) 
[.090] 
-19.943 
(9.626) 
[15.828] 
 .214 
(.024) 
[.120] 
-20.200 
 (11.223) 
[14.946] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .005 
(.002) 
[.004] 
  .005 
(.003) 
[.004] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    
 
-.520 
(.010) 
[.170] 
.515 
(.024) 
[.167] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     -.0003 
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 3.816 
(.312) 
[.979] 
95.938 
(527.077) 
[178.075] 
19931.68 
(9484.842) 
[15780.54] 
.274 
(1.595) 
3.816  
[1.011] 
-419.624 
(47.253) 
[238.185] 
19931.75 
(11228.46) 
[14900.9] 
R-Squared 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.64 0.32 0.34 
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Here again, the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= 5.89, p= 0.000) for GDP growth rate is 
significant and positive. These are presented in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 3, which 
confirms the difference in GDP growth rate in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 compared 
to before the genocide period. This coefficient indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda 
we can expect GDP growth rate to increase on average 5.9 percent when Rwanda started 
benefiting from the developmental state economic model. The sign of β3 is positive, which is 
what we expected, and it is statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. However, 
the coefficient for β3 appears higher (17.33 & 17.35) in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 3 when we 
checked for the country specific by year time effects. β3 remains consistently positive in the two 
specification regressions EQ5 and EQ6. Therefore, in Rwanda for every additional year we can 
expect GDP growth rate to increase by an average 17.4 percent. The sign of β3 is positive as 
expected and it is statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. We also use real 
GDP per capita to find the difference between Rwanda and Burundi based on their economic 
models. The R-squared is 0.2273, which means that approximately 23% of the variability Gross 
Domestic Product growth rate is accounted for by the predictor variables in the model related to 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
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Figure 8. Real GDP per capita in National Currency (Thousands) 
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Table 4:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Real GDP 
per capita. 
Y variable: Real GDP per capita in National Currency (Thousands) in Rwanda and Burundi 
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 7.778 .271 7.395 8.480 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3)Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5)Linear cst (6)Quadratic cst 
TREATED .191*** 
(.003) 
[.048] 
.191*** 
(.004) 
[.037] 
.191*** 
(.002) 
[.035] 
.191*** 
(.022) 
[.048] 
-38.885*** 
(6.767) 
[8.314] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER -.263*** 
(.010) 
[.048] 
-.640*** 
(.218) 
[.064] 
-.640*** 
(.218) 
[.062] 
.136 
(.228) 
-.263 
[.051] 
 
-.423*** 
(.037) 
[.073] 
-.420*** 
(.042) 
[.068] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.42*** 
(.005) 
[.068] 
.42*** 
(.039) 
[.052] 
.42*** 
(.043) 
[.050] 
.42*** 
(.066) 
[.068] 
-.017 
(.091) 
[.103] 
-.023 
(.102) 
[.096] 
 
TIME  .017 
(.010) 
[.0023874] 
-1.094 
(2.227) 
[.404252] 
 .007 
(.001) 
[.003] 
-1.085 
(2.252) 
[.347] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .0003 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
  .0003 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    .020 
(.003) 
[.004] 
-.020 
(.004) 
[.004] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     .000 
 (-.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 7.711 
(.008) 
[.034] 
-26.230 
(19.576) 
[4.734] 
1081.843 
(2210.028) 
[403.043] 
7.550 
(.019) 
7.711 
[.036] 
-6.692 
(2.769) 
[5.879] 
1081.938 
(2245.451) 
[346.063] 
R-squared 0.71 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.89 
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In Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 from table 4, we found that the effect of β3Treated x Afterit 
(β3= .4162206, p= 0.000) for Real GDP per capita is significant and positive, which takes into 
account the difference in real GDP per capita in Rwanda relative to Burundi before and after 
1994. Consistent with Figure 8, this coefficient indicates that for every additional year in 
Rwanda we can expect natural log of real GDP per capita to increase by an average 41.6 percent. 
The sign of β3 is positive as expected and it is statistically significant at both the 5% level and 
1% level. Moreover, regarding real GDP per capita, the last two Columns 6 and 7 show the 
coefficient for β3 decreases and turns negative (-.017 and -.023) when we checked for 
specifications between both countries and year time effects. The sign of β3 is negative which is 
not as expected and it appears not statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The 
R-squared is 0.7103, which means that approximately 71% of the variability of real GDP per 
capita is accounted for by predictor variables in the model related to Rwanda and Burundi. 
When we compared the GDP and GDP per capita for both countries Rwanda and Burundi 
over 40 years from 1974 to 2014, we found that before and after 1994, they have always been 
higher in Rwanda than in Burundi except in 1994 and then the gap started increasing around year 
2000 until now. Rwanda has done remarkably well economically, emerging out of a horrific 
genocide in 1994. What is the real cause of this continual economic growth? Economic success 
in Rwanda is first and foremost political. We found that Rwanda has made significant progress in 
GDP, GDP per capita, and economic growth because of the important role played by the ruling 
party-state in the promotion of development, which at once brought political stability, rebuilt an 
autonomous and competent bureaucracy after the collapse of the administration during the 
genocide. It also created a strong private sector through party ownership holdings such as Tri-
Star Investments (Tri Star/CVL) and Horizon group, and applied good governance practices (the 
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rule of law underpinned by viable institutions). These four things represent the main features of a 
developmental state economic model (Meyns  and  Musamba, 2010). The Rwandan Patriotic 
Front (RPF) as a ruling party and Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) are politically involved in the 
private sector of the economy (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012). The use of party companies to 
launch business activity, places the ruling party at the heart of the economy.19 It is also well 
appreciated that the rate of economic growth in Rwanda has averaged 8% since 2001 and has 
been pro-poor growth because it has considerably reduced poverty. In addition, this rapid and 
strong economic growth has been sufficient and quite superior to the population growth rate for a 
population in which one million people have been lifted out of poverty. 
Another reason Rwanda sustains its economic growth is that it started to implement a 
series of political and economic policies during the period of recovery from 1994 to 1999, which 
have been effectively applied until now such as Gacaca20, Umuganda21, Girinka (One Cow per 
Family Program), Itorero (Civic Education or Rwanda’s traditional and cultural of values such as 
language, dancing, songs, patriotism, defense, Agaciro (Development Fund), Ubudehe (Social 
Categorization for Collection Action and Mutual Support), Imihigo (Performance Contracts  
which is an ancestral practice to compete among one another), Decentralization, Urugwiro 
dialogue 1998-1999, Reduction Strategic program (PRSP1) & Economic Development and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS2), and Rwanda vision 2020 Umurenge Programme 
(VUP)22. Therefore, economic growth is continuing, supported by these specific economic and 
                                                           
19 Why the developmental state economic model of Rwanda cannot work anywhere else. The Conversation.  
https://theconversation.com/why-rwandas-development-model-wouldnt-work-elsewhere-in-africa-89699 
20
 Gacaca is a traditional system for conflict resolution 
21
 Umuganda also translated as ‘coming together in common purpose to achieve an outcome. In Rwanda, it is a community work 
day, which takes place every on the last Saturday of each month from 8a.m. and lasts for at least three hours. Rwandans 
between 18 and 65 are obliged to participate in Umuganda whereas participation by those above 65 years is optional 
22
 Vision 2020 Umurenge Programme (VUP) - is an Integrated Local Development Program to Accelerate Poverty Eradication, 
Rural Growth, and Social Protection. This is an initiative by the Government of Rwanda (GoR) in collaboration with 
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public policies. As Norman and Stiglitz pointed out “Growth is the result of policy reforms” 
(Noman & Stiglitz, 2012, 17).  
Rwanda has an effective and authoritarian state that brings into being development. 
However, the state in Burundi is weak and failed state delivering poor economic performance. In 
Burundi, GDP and GDP per capita indicators showed that this country has grown slowly relative 
to Rwanda, created unnecessary conflicts, and returned to political instability, violence, and 
chaos after having experienced 10 years of true peace. Burundi’s dismal economic growth 
performance is mainly a direct result of a failure in the country’s governance (Nkurunziza & 
Ngaruko, 2004). In addition, poor economic performance in Burundi has been shaped by 
political instability, so that the country failed to reconstruct national unity and a nation that is 
secure and at peace (Ministère du plan et du développement communal/cellule prospective & 
Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement au Burundi, 2011). The two ethnic groups 
Hutus and Tutsis in the country continue to compete and fight to control state institutions and 
capture rents. As Lastinger pointed out “A decade into the post-war period, very little has 
changed within Burundi’s political landscape: the poor remain poor; the institutionalized system 
of corruption and clientelism continues to plague the government at all levels” (Lastinger, 2017). 
Other factors also had contributed to economic growth in Rwanda. The real per capita 
income is the most reliable indicator of economic growth. Additionally, another best indicator to 
measure and judge the performance of an economy is the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which is composed of three pillars namely the real per capita income, life expectancy at birth, 
and education level. While it constitutes the most important factor in poverty reduction, 
                                                           
development partners and NGOs. The aim is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2020 
(Vision 2020 Umurenge, EDPRS Flagship Program document (2007) 
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economic growth remains necessary and an unescapable aim of all economic development 
processes, but alone it is insufficient. To sustain economic growth, other important social and 
economic variables such as health, education, technology, energy, environment, and political 
stability, to name a few, must be taken into consideration and be enhanced (Todaro & Smith, 
2008, p. 20). Hence, other indicators of human development, such as life expectancy, Children 
mortality of under five, Birth rate, Death rate, Human capital index, and literacy, have also 
improved in Rwanda after the genocide. In this comparative analysis between Rwanda and 
Burundi, we included other economic indicators rather than just looking only at economic 
growth. Let us examine three other dependent variables mentioned above to explore how both 
countries performed to sustain their economic growth. 
 
 
Figure 9. Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 
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Table 5: Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Life 
Expectancy at birth. 
Y variable: Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 3.894 0.148 3.314 4.158 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5) Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED -.086*** 
(.006) 
[.041] 
-.086*** 
(.001) 
[.040] 
-.086*** 
(.003) 
[.035] 
-.086** 
(.043) 
[.041] 
2.172** 
(1.047) 
[10.283] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .110*** 
(.011) 
[.041] 
.004 
(.041) 
[.069] 
.004 
(.014) 
[.061] 
.253*** 
(.031) 
.110 
[.045] 
 
-.008 
(.034) 
[.090] 
-.006 
(.032) 
[.079] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.087*** 
(.005) 
[.057] 
.087*** 
(.003) 
[.056] 
.087*** 
(.018) 
[.050] 
.087 
(.053) 
[.057] 
 .112*** 
(.015) 
[.127] 
.11 
(.081) 
[.112] 
 
TIME  .005 
(.002) 
[.003] 
-1.882 
(1.712) 
[.400] 
 .005 
(.001) 
[.004] 
-1.883 
(1.725) 
[.403] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  
 
.001 
(.0004) 
[.0001] 
  .001 
(.0004) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    -.001 
(.001) 
[.005] 
.001 
(.003) 
[.005] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
    
  
 -.000  
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 3.860 
(.001) 
[.029] 
-5.721 
(3.073) 
[5.107] 
1875.758 
(1707.538) 
[398.550] 
3.844 
(.061) 
3.860 
[.032] 
-6.850 
(2.376) 
[7.271] 
1875.715 
(1719.853) 
[401.304] 
R-Squared 0.32 0.35 0.51 0.73 0.35 0.51 
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We examine the output from this regression to capture the difference in Life Expectancy 
at Birth in both countries before and after the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. We found that the 
effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= .087, p= 0.000) is significant and positive. Results are shown in 
Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 5. This coefficient captures the difference in the life expectancy 
at birth in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 compared to before the genocide period and 
indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda we can expect the natural log of life 
expectancy at birth to increase by an average of 8.74 percent. The sign of β3 is positive as 
expected and statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The standard error of the 
coefficient for β3 is smaller than that of β2. Therefore, my model estimates the coefficient for β3 
with greater precision. Furthermore, the coefficient β3 increases in the two equations EQ5 and 
EQ6 (.112 and .11) as shown in the last two Columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 when we estimated the 
specification between the two countries and year time effects. The sign of β3 is positive as 
expected, but it is not statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The R–squared 
is 0.316 meaning that approximately 32% of the variability of Life Expectancy at Birth is 
accounted for by the predictor variables in the model. Now let us turn to the dependent variable 
Children mortality of under five and examine whether the two countries Rwanda and Burundi 
show differences in outcomes.  
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Figure 10. Children of under-five deaths in Numbers (Thousands) 
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Table 6: Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Children of 
under-five deaths in Numbers (Thousands). 
Y variable: Children of under-five deaths in Numbers (Thousands)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 10.637 .277 9.632 11.016 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5) Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .192*** 
(.009) 
[.076] 
.192*** 
(.017) 
[.066] 
.192*** 
(.006) 
[.056] 
.192*** 
(.025) 
(.076) 
76.213*** 
(1.641) 
[14.471] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER -.054 
(.019) 
[.076] 
.407 
(.434) 
[.115] 
.407 
(.440) 
[.096] 
-.429 
(.399) 
-.054 
[.082] 
 
-.015 
(.040) 
[.127] 
-.018 
(.035) 
[.096] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
-.374*** 
(.008) 
[.108] 
-.374*** 
(.038) 
[.094] 
-.374*** 
(.065) 
[.079] 
-.374*** 
(.101) 
[.108] 
.47*** 
(.017) 
[.179] 
.48*** 
(.086) 
[.136] 
 
TIME  -.021 
(.020) 
[.004] 
3.522 
(2.331) 
[.634] 
 -.002 
(.002) 
[.005] 
3.502 
(2.388) 
[.4883] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  -.001 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
  -.001 
(.001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    -.038 
(.001) 
[.007] 
.038 
(.004) 
[.006] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     -.000 
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 10.662 
(.004) 
[.054] 
52.250 
(38.989) 
[8.483] 
-3479.604 
(2304.244) 
[632.195] 
10.6 
(.015) 
10.662 
[.058] 
14.240 
(3.830) 
[10.232] 
-3479.508 
(2381.311) 
[486.9155] 
R-squared  0.31 0.48 0.64 0.71 0.63 0.79 
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Table 6 provides the results from the regression model when we estimate the relationship 
between the dependent variable Children under five deaths and the other seven indicator 
variables. The effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= -.374, p= 0.000) is significant and negative as 
presented in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 in Table 6.  This coefficient grasps the difference in the 
number of children dying before reaching age five in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 
compared to before the genocide period and shows that for every additional year in Rwanda 
relative to Burundi we can expect natural log of death of children under five to decrease on 
average 37.4 percent. The sign of β3 is negative as expected and β3 is statistically significant at 
the 5% level and 1% level. The smaller the standard error, the more precise the estimate. The 
standard error of the coefficient for β3 is smaller than that of β2. Therefore, my model estimates 
the coefficient for β3 with greater precision. However, the coefficient for β3 turns positive and 
increases in the two equations EQ5 and EQ6 (.47 and .48) when I estimated the specification 
between the two countries and year fixed effects as shown in the last two Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 6. The sign of β3 is positive which is not as expected but is statistically significant at both 
the 5% level and 1% level in EQ6, and only statistically significant at the 5% level in EQ5. 
According to these results, in Rwanda for every additional year we can expect the number of 
children dying before reaching age five to increase on average 48 percent when we added the 
specifications. The R–squared is 0.3083 meaning that approximately 31% of the variability of 
Number of children dying before reaching age five is accounted for by the predictor variables in 
the model related to Rwanda and Burundi.  
Another important indicator needed to sustain economic growth is human capital. Both 
education and human capital have a strong relationship.  Rwanda and Burundi should invest 
significantly in education to acquire and develop human capital in order to achieve higher 
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productivity. It is well known human capital provides better standards of living for people and in 
general well-educated people also enjoy good health. A close look at the trend of human capital 
in Rwanda and Burundi indicates a clear distinction between the two countries, where there is a 
difference in the two to build capabilities and create a more skilled workforce.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Human Capital Index 
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Table 7:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Human 
Capital Index, based on years of schooling and returns to education. 
Y variable: Human Capital Index, based on years of schooling and returns to education  
Descriptive 
Statistics 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 .227 .117 .092 .551 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1)Estimate (2) Linear (3)Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5)Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .079** 
(.001) 
[.018] 
.079*** 
(.002) 
[.009] 
.079*** 
(.004)  
[.006] 
.079*** 
(.006) 
[.018] 
-12.620 
(.376) 
[1.755] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .120*** 
(.009) 
[.018] 
-.062 
(.073) 
[.016] 
-.062 
(.086) 
[.011] 
.276*** 
(.085) 
.120 
[.023] 
 
.008 
(.010) 
[.015] 
.009*** 
(.003) 
[.005] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.085*** 
(.004) 
[.025] 
.085*** 
(.003) 
[.013] 
.085*** 
(.009) 
[.009] 
.085*** 
(.013) 
[.025] 
-.056** 
(.004) 
[.022] 
-.057*** 
(.007) 
[.007] 
 
TIME  .008 
(.003) 
[.001] 
-.607 
(.142) 
[.073] 
 .005 
(.001) 
[.001] 
-.604 
(.169) 
[.027] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .0002 
(.00004) 
[.00002] 
 .079 
(.004) 
[.006] 
.079 
(.006) 
[.018] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    .006 
(.0002) 
[.001] 
-.006 
(.0003) 
[.0003] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     .000  
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT .107 
(.003) 
[.012] 
-16.258 
(6.538) 
[1.152] 
597.1416 
(137.356) 
[72.661] 
.0671 
(.035) 
.107 
[.016] 
-9.908 
(.904) 
[1.241] 
597.181 
(168.179) 
[26.436] 
R-squared 0.80 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 
 
  
57 
Table 7 in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 shows β3 = .085 is the coefficient for Human Capital 
Index.  Indeed, the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= .085, p= 0.000) is significant and positive, 
which captures the difference in Human Capital Index in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 
compared to before the genocide period. This coefficient indicates that for every additional year 
in Rwanda relative to Burundi we can expect the natural log of Human Capital Index to increase 
on average 8.5 percent. The sign of β3 is positive as expected and it is statistically significant at 
both the 5% level and 1% level. The standard error of the coefficient for β3 is smaller than that of 
β2. Therefore, my model estimates the coefficient for β3 with better precision. Moreover, in the 
last two Columns 6 and 7 in Table 7, the coefficient for β3 turns negative and diminishes in the 
two equations EQ5 and EQ6 (-.056 and -.057) when we estimated the specification between the 
two countries and year fixed effects. The sign of β3 is negativewhich is not as expected, but it is 
statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level in EQ6, and then only statistically 
significant at the 5% level in EQ5. Henceforth, in Rwanda for every additional year we can 
expect the Human Capital Index to decrease by an average 5.6 percent when we added the 
specification, which contradicts the previous results of β3. The R–squared is 0.7948 meaning that 
approximately 80% of the variability of the Human Capital Index is accounted for by the 
predictor variables in the model.We also found that Rwanda has been performing well relative to 
Burundi in other dependent variables such as Agriculture, Exports and Services.  
In fact, Agriculture, Exports, Services, and Savings (gross domestic savings and gross 
savings) drive the economic growth that we see in Rwanda. Agriculture and exports are expected 
to continue driving growth with the support of the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali 
which opened in 2012. We are going to examine now the output from our model equations for 
the dependent variables of Agriculture and Exports capture the difference in both countries. 
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Figure 12. Agriculture, value-added (% of GDP) 
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Table 8: Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Agriculture, 
value – added (% of GDP). 
Y variable: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 3.799 .209 3.470 4.188 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED -.357*** 
(.006) 
[.038] 
-.357*** 
(.013) 
[.020] 
-.357*** 
(.013) 
[.020] 
-.357*** 
(.024) 
[.038] 
14.841*** 
(.652) 
[4.722] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER -.295*** 
(.019) 
[.038] 
.094 
(.085) 
[.034] 
.094 
(.086) 
[.034] 
-.640*** 
(.129) 
-.295 
[.050] 
 
.010 
(.008) 
[.041] 
.011** 
(.005) 
[042] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.182*** 
(.008) 
[.053] 
.182*** 
(.009) 
[.028] 
.182*** 
(.010) 
[.028] 
.182*** 
(.029) 
[.053] 
.351*** 
(.020) 
[.059] 
.35*** 
(.011) 
[.059] 
 
TIME  -.018 
(.004) 
[.001] 
-.227 
(.551) 
[.224] 
 -.014 
(.0002) 
[.002] 
-.230 
(.573) 
[.211] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .0001 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
  .0001 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    -.008 
(.0003) 
[.002] 
.007 
(.001) 
[.002] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     -0.000  
(0.000) 
[0.000] 
 
CONSTANT 4.080 
(.013) 
[.027] 
39.161 
(7.680) 
[2.512] 
247.284 
(552.736) 
[223.728] 
4.312 
(.132) 
4.080 
[.035] 
31.562 
(.302) 
[3.339] 
247.106 
(571.33) 
[210.408] 
R-Squared 0.7 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.93 0.93 
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Clearly, the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= .182, p= 0.000) in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 in 
Table 8 is significant and positive, which captures the difference in the Agriculture, value – 
added (% of GDP) in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 compared to before the genocide 
period. This coefficient indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda relative to Burundi we 
can expect the natural log of Agriculture (% of GDP) to increase by an average 18.2 percent. The 
sign of β3 is positive as expected and statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. 
The standard error of the coefficient for β3 is smaller than that of β2 Therefore, my model 
estimates the coefficient for β3 with greater precision. In addition, the coefficient for β3 displayed 
in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 8 increases in the two equations EQ5 and EQ6 (.351 and .35) when 
we estimated the specification between the two countries and year fixed effects. The sign of β3 is 
also positive as expected and it is statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. 
Therefore, in Rwanda for every additional year we can expect natural log of Agriculture (% of 
GDP) to increase by on average 35 percent. The coefficient β3 augments when we checked for 
the specification. The R–squared is 0.7019 meaning that approximately 70% of the variability of 
Agriculture (% of GDP) is accounted for by the predictor variables in the model related to 
Rwanda and Burundi. 
The economy in Rwanda is based mainly on agriculture, which has considerable potential 
for economic growth and modernization. Indeed, Rwanda had started to modernize the 
agriculture sector by introducing systems of agriculture production and the development of 
agribusiness. Actually, expenditure on agriculture, education, and health also had positive impact 
on economic growth in Rwanda. We see that the contribution of agriculture to GDP has 
gradually decreased from 90 to 36% during the period 1974 – 2014. However, agriculture sector 
continue to employ 80-90% of the active population, in which women represent the majority and 
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mostly Hutu farmers who live in rural areas. Generally, the majority of Tutsis are not interested 
in agricultural activities, and they stay in urban areas where theyprefer to raise cattle instead. In 
Rwanda 70% of the population lives in rural areas, and are mostly Hutu farmers, and thirty 
percent reside in major cities such as Kigali, Butare, Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and Gitarama. Rwanda 
has always achieved food self-sufficiency because it produced almost 90 percent of total food 
required to feed the entire population. As already stated above, coffee and tea are the country’s 
most important export commodities. Agriculture contributes to about 70-80% of the country 
exports revenues. 
Rwanda is the “land of a Thousand Hills”, and there are hillsides throughout the 
landlocked country and arable land still represents about 52% odf the country. This is necessary 
for agricultural development. The country is too small for its dense population. Therefore, land 
becomes a scarce commodity, but farmer labor remains abundant. However, there is also a 
shortage of skilled farm labor. To overcome these obstacles, Rwanda, at first sought land reform 
and second provided training to form skilled farmers. Rwanda formulates and implemented 
special agriculture policy called PSTA I since 2004, which was improved in 2008 and became 
PSTA II, composed of four interrelated programs. The first program serves to intensify and 
develop sustainable production systems. The goal of the second program is to support and assure 
the professionalization of producers. The promotion of commodity chains and agrobusiness 
development stands as the mission of the third program. Finally, the last and fourth program 
focuses on institutional development. Rwanda’s agriculture policy puts more focus on three 
essential points such as the creation of new farming systems to operate large productive units, 
offer farmer training to make them skilled and knowledgeable, and develop entrepreneurial 
capacities. The Rwandan government through its ministry of agriculture launched a program 
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called Girinka, which consists of offering a cow to poor families, and other programs to train 
farmers and agro-entrepreneurs to develop value-added products and create new products. In 
addition, Rwanda distributes improved seeds to farmers and helps them to find solutions vis-à-
vis water irrigation and soil erosion problems. All these actions and programs initiated by the 
government of Rwanda made agriculture remain the driver and backbone of economic growth in 
the post genocide period.  
The sectors of agriculture and exports are often linked together and strongly intertwined 
to one to another. Let us now compare the performances of these two countries in the sector of 
exports of goods and services. 
 
 
Figure 13. Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
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Table 9:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Exports of 
goods and services (% of GDP). 
Y variable: Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 2.245 .323 1.545 3.047 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1)Estimate (2) Linear (3)Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED -.031** 
(.012) 
[.095] 
-.031*** 
(.005) 
[.096] 
-.031** 
(.013) 
[.079] 
-.031 
(.073) 
[.095] 
-2.964 
(3.227) 
[24.729] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER -.365*** 
(.038) 
[.095] 
-.398*** 
(.109) 
[.167] 
-.398*** 
(.005) 
[.137] 
-.184*** 
(.062) 
-.365 
[.114] 
 
-.382*** 
(.093) 
[.217] 
-.377*** 
(.040) 
[.178] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
.335*** 
(.016) 
[.135] 
.335*** 
(.014) 
[.136] 
.335*** 
(.014) 
[.112] 
.335*** 
(.104) 
[.135] 
.302*** 
(.039) 
[.307] 
.293*** 
(.089) 
[.252] 
 
TIME  .002 
(.005) 
[.006] 
-5.318 
(3.284) 
[.902] 
 .001 
(.004) 
[.009] 
 
-5.317 
(3.307) 
[.908] 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  .001 
(.001) 
[.0002] 
  .001 
(.001) 
[.0002] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    .002 
(.002) 
[.013] 
-.002 
(.001) 
[.010] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
      .000  
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 2.359 
(.029) 
[.067] 
-.595 
(9.262) 
[12.278] 
5302.341 
(3273.616) 
[899.346] 
2.404 
(.175) 
2.359 
[.081] 
.872 
(7.725) 
[17.486] 
5302.326 
(3297.676) 
[905.619] 
R-Squared 0.21 0.21 0.47 0.77 0.21 0.47 
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For Exports of goods and services, the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= .3347007, p= 
0.000) in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 9 is significant and positive. It shows the difference in 
the Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) in Rwanda relative to Burundi before and after 
1994. This coefficient signifies that for every additional year in Rwanda relative to Burundi, we 
can expect the natural log of Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) to increase by an 
average 33.5 percent. The sign of β3 is positive as expected and statistically significant at both 
the 5% level and 1% level. The standard error of the coefficient for β3 is smaller than that of β2. 
Therefore, my model estimates the coefficient with greater precision. However, the coefficient 
for β3Treated x After, presented in Columns 6 and 7 in Table 9 decreases a little in the two 
equations EQ5 and EQ6 (.302 and .293) when we assessed the specification between the two 
countries and year. The sign of β3 is positive as expected and statistically significant at both the 
5% level and 1% level. The R–squared is 0.2079 meaning that approximately 21% of the 
variability of Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) is accounted for by the predictor 
variables in the model related to Rwanda and Burundi. 
The sector of Exports of goods and services is very dynamic and brings important 
resources in Rwanda. Tourism, minerals, coffee, and tea are Rwanda’s main source of foreign 
exchange.23 The key minerals for exports in Rwanda are coltan and cassiterite.24 Minerals in 
2013 represent 32 % of total goods exports by value, up from 22 % in 2009. They contributed 15 
percentage points to growth in 2013. Coltan (Rwanda’s most important mineral) grew by 136 % 
in 2013. Tourism is Rwanda’s largest single export activity, accounting for about 30 percent of 
total exports.25 Coffee, tea, and minerals accounted for 59% of total exports in 2013 for example, 
                                                           
23
 The World CIA Factbook 
24 Rwanda EN 2014 African Economic Outlook 
25 Rethinking Africa’s structural transformation. The rise of new industries 
January 11, 2018 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/rethinking-africas-structural-transformation/ 
65 
five percentage points higher than in 2011. Conversely, Burundi’s exports are essentially cash 
crops, namely coffee, tea and cotton. Coffee accounts for more than 80 percent of total exports. 
Burundi is a primarily agricultural economy, with coffee, tea, and cotton accounting for over 90 
percent of foreign exchange earnings (Lastinger, 2017). Burundi has few export destinations and 
has less revenue in international trade because coffee and tea are exported in their raw states with 
almost no value-added. The country is endowed with enormous mineral deposits. For instance, 
Burundi has the second largest coltan reserve in the region and 6% of world nickel, but the 
extractive industries provide only less than 1% of GDP. Mining remains mainly an artisanal and 
informal activity. 
Even though today's economic growth in Rwanda is driven by agriculture and exports, 
we acknowledge very well that in Rwanda and Burundi, the economy has long been dominated 
by the primary sector of agriculture, the secondary sector of industry and manufacturing, and the 
tertiary sector of service. When we look back in the past, we note that among all early or late 
advanced capitalist and rich countries, none has fully developed without industrialization. This 
assumption remains evident and still valid until today, so it is almost impossible to achieve 
economic development without industrializing. The results of variables such as Industry, and 
Manufacturing are not consistent with Rwanda’s recent economic growth. Let us take a close 
look at these two dependent variables in order to show the difference between both countries. 
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Figure14. Industry, value-added (% of GDP) 
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Table 10:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Industry, 
value added (% of GDP). 
Y variable: Industry, value added (% of GDP)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 2.794 .200 2.22 3.204 
Regressions 
Coefficients (1) Estimate (2) Linear (3) Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .250*** 
(.006) 
[.052] 
.250*** 
(.022) 
[.050] 
.250*** 
(.030) 
[.047] 
.250*** 
(.062) 
[.052] 
31.058*** 
(1.034) 
[12.337] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .079*** 
(.011) 
[.052] 
-.087 
(.169) 
[.087] 
-.087 
(.197) 
[.082] 
.600** 
(.262) 
.079 
[.052] 
 
-.257*** 
(.065) 
[.108] 
-.258*** 
(.040) 
[.102] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
-.420*** 
(.0246057) 
[.073] 
-.420*** 
(.0315039) 
[.071] 
-.420*** 
(.0400003) 
[.067] 
-.420*** 
(.0776187) 
[.073] 
-.078 
(.2087159) 
[.153] 
-.076 
(.097) 
[.144] 
 
TIME  .008 
(.008) 
[.003] 
1.617 
(.486) 
[.541] 
 .015 
(.0004) 
[.004] 
1.609 
(.461) 
[.519] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  -.0004 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
  -.0004 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    -.016 
(.001) 
[.006] 
.016 
(.004) 
[.006] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     -.000  
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 2.735 
(.008) 
[.036] 
-12.144 
(15.698) 
[6.392] 
-1616.973 
(475.760) 
[539.722] 
2.270 
(.323) 
2.74 
[.037] 
-27.548 
(.720) 
[8.724] 
-1616.848 
(458.514) 
[517.739] 
R-Squared 0.4 0.44 0.50 0.67 0.49 0.55 
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For Industry, value-added (% of GDP), the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= -.4196602, 
p= 0.000) in Columns 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Table 10 is significant and negative, which captures the 
difference in Industry (% of GDP) in Rwanda relative to Burundi before and after 1994. This 
coefficient indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda relative to Burundi we can expect 
the natural log of Industry (% of GDP) to decrease by a percent. The sign of β3 is negative which 
is not as expected, but statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The standard 
error of the β2Afterit coefficient is smaller than that of β3Treated x Afterit. Therefore, this model 
estimates the coefficient β2 with greater precision. However, in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 10 the 
coefficient for β3 remains negative and drops a great extent in the two equations EQ5 and EQ7 
(-.078 and -.0764) when we estimated the specification between the two countries and year fixed 
effects. The sign of β3 is still negative which is not as expected and it is not statistically 
significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The R–squared is 0.3976, which means that 
approximately 40% of the variability of Industry (% of GDP) is accounted for by the predictor 
variables in the model related to Rwanda and Burundi.  
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Figure 15. Manufacturing, value-added (% of GDP) 
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Table 11:  Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on 
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP). 
Y variable: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 2.268 .346 1.472 2.907 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1)Estimate (2) Linear (3)Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5)Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .277*** 
(.032) 
[.079] 
.277*** 
(.023) 
[.079] 
.277*** 
(.046) 
[.070] 
.277*** 
(.089) 
[.079] 
43.585*** 
(7.184) 
[19.766] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .094*** 
(.018) 
[.079] 
.182 
(.241) 
[.138] 
.182 
(.255) 
[.122] 
.414 
(.427) 
.094 
[.079] 
 
-.058*** 
(.022) 
[.173] 
-.061 
(.071) 
[.151] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
-.774*** 
(.044) 
[.112] 
-.774*** 
(.046) 
[.112] 
-.774*** 
(.073) 
[.099] 
-.774*** 
(.121) 
[.112] 
-.294*** 
(.056) 
[.245] 
-.289 
(.171) 
[.214] 
 
TIME  -.004 
(.011) 
[.005] 
3.671 
(1.784) 
[.799] 
 .007 
(.001) 
[.007] 
3.66 
(1.762) 
[.770] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  -.001 
(.0005) 
[.0002] 
  -.001 
(.0004) 
[.0002] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    -.022 
(.004) 
[.010] 
.022 
(.008) 
[.009] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     -.000 
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 2.277 
(.013) 
[.056] 
10.232 
(21.935) 
[10.144] 
-3653.605 
(1766.109) 
(796.575) 
1.761 
(.598) 
2.277 
[.056] 
-11.422 
(2.746) 
[13.976] 
-3653.467 
(1755.777) 
[767.298] 
R-Squared 0.53 0.53 0.64 0.73 0.56 0.67 
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We see that the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= -.7742161, p= 0.000) in Columns 2, 3, 
4, and 5 of Table 11 is significant and negative. It catches the difference in Manufacturing, 
value-added (% of GDP) in Rwanda relative to Burundi before and after 1994. This coefficient 
indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda we can expect the natural log of 
Manufacturing (% of GDP) to decrease by an average 77.42 percent. The sign of β3 is negative, 
which is not what we would expect, but it is statistically significant at both the 5% level and 1% 
level. The standard error of the β2 coefficient is smaller than that of β3. Therefore, this model is 
able to estimate the coefficient β2 with greater precision. Furthermore, the coefficient β3 stays 
negative and falls in the two equations EQ5 and EQ6 (-.294 and .289) from Columns 6 and 7 of 
Table 11 when we estimated the specification between the two countries and year fixed effects. 
The sign of β3 is negative which is not as expected and it is not statistically significant at both 
the 5% level and 1% level in EQ6. The R–squared is 0.525, which means that approximately 
53% of the variability of Manufacturing (% of GDP) is accounted for by the predictor variables 
in the model related to Rwanda and Burundi.  
This study clearly shows that Economic growth in Rwanda is not driven yet by 
manufacturing and industry sectors. We found agriculture and services do and constitute the 
engine of economic transformation. Growth in services is generated by trade, transport and 
communication, finance and insurance, public administration and education, which all together 
account for 57% of service sector output. However, Rwanda has the highest transport costs in the 
region, estimated at 40% of the value its imports/exports. The tertiary sector has expanded and 
boomed in recent years accounted for 45 % of GDP in 2013. The boom has most prominent in 
the banking, insurance, post and telecommunications, and hotels and restaurants sectors. Tourism 
continues to grow gradually with the important investment of Rwanda in productive 
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infrastructure. In addition, tourism contributes more towards both exports and services sectors in 
Rwanda. Currently, the share of services to GDP is higher than that of industry and 
manufacturing combined. For Samir Amin, what is happening in Rwanda today is the opposite to 
what he thinks about Africa countries. A country cannot improve services sector without 
industrialization at first. The services sector is an important part of any economy, but it cannot 
prosper and expand without the development of manufacturing and industry sectors. In any 
country, economic development depends on the growth and evolution of these three sectors of 
the economy. However, the service sector is always growing at the speedier rate and has become 
a largest sector of economy. Service sector usually begins from the production of goods and 
service and ends with the exchange and consumption of them between sellers and buyers. What 
is the difference between Rwanda and Burundi in regard to the services sector? 
 
Figure 16. Services, value-added (% of GDP) 
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Table 12: Coefficient estimates of the model: Effects of seven indicator variables on Services, etc., 
value added (% of GDP). 
Y variable: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)  
Descriptive Statistics Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
76 3.595 .267 3.037 4.001 
Regression Models 
Coefficients (1)Estimate (2) Linear (3)Quadratic (5)Time F.E. (5) Linear cst (6) Quadratic cst 
TREATED .409*** 
(.006) 
[.040] 
.409*** 
(.009) 
[.023] 
.409*** 
(.009) 
[.023] 
.409*** 
(.023) 
[.040] 
-13.600*** 
(.399)  
[5.654] 
 
0 
(omitted) 
AFTER .441*** 
(.020) 
[.040] 
.045 
(.075) 
[.040] 
.045 
(.078) 
[.040] 
.700*** 
(.016) 
.441 
[.052] 
 
.123*** 
(.009) 
[.050] 
.122*** 
(.012) 
[.050] 
TREATED 
_AFTER 
-.194*** 
(.008) 
[.057] 
-.194*** 
(.004) 
[.032] 
-.194*** 
(.005) 
[.032] 
-.194*** 
(.032) 
[.057] 
-.350*** 
(.003) 
[.070] 
-.349*** 
(.004) 
[.070] 
 
TIME  .018 
(.004) 
[.002] 
.265 
(.233) 
[.262] 
 .015 
(.001) 
[.002] 
.268 
(.248) 
[.253] 
 
TIME 
SQUARED 
  -.0001 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
  -.0001 
(.0001) 
[.0001] 
 
TREATED 
TIME 
    .007 
(.0002) 
[.003] 
-.007 
(.0002) 
[.003] 
 
TREATED 
TIMESQU 
     .000  
(.000) 
[.000] 
 
CONSTANT 3.219 
(.014) 
[.028] 
-32.439 
(7.158) 
[2.928] 
-278.243 
(235.337) 
[260.693] 
3.047 
(.011) 
3.219 
[.037] 
-25.434 
(.972)   
[3.998] 
-278.038 
(247.059) 
[251.714] 
R-squared 0.8 0.93 0.94 0.97 0.94 0.94 
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We have here the effect of β3Treated x Afterit (β3= -.1942849, p= 0.000) in Columns 2, 3, 
4, and 5 of Table 12. The coefficient is significant and negative, which captures the difference in 
Services, value- added (% of GDP) in Rwanda relative to Burundi after 1994 compared to before 
the genocide period. This coefficient indicates that for every additional year in Rwanda relative 
to Burundi we can expect the natural log of Services, value- added (% of GDP) to decrease by an 
average 19.43 percent. The sign of β3 is negative which is not as expected, but it is statistically 
significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. The standard error of the coefficient β3 is smaller 
than that of β2. Therefore, this model can estimate the coefficient for β3 with greater precision. 
The coefficient for β3 remains negative and increases in the three equations EQ5 and EQ6 (-.35 
and -.349) in Columns 6 and 7 of Table 12 when we estimated the specification between the two 
countries and year. The sign of β3 stays negative which is not as expected, but it is statistically 
significant at both the 5% level and 1% level. For that reason, we can continue to say that for 
every additional year Services, value- added (% of GDP) in Rwanda decreases by on average 35 
percent when we added the specification. The R–squared is 0.7963, which means that 
approximately 80% of the variability of Services, value- added (% of GDP) is accounted for by 
the predictor variables in the model related to Rwanda and Burundi. 
Overall, Rwanda relative to Burundi performs well in all dependent variables except in 
two important variables industry and manufacturing. On the contrary, Burundi in paradox where 
economic has been grown slowly for the last two decades appears to be more industrialized than 
Rwanda despite its so-called economic miracle. Industrialization is the big challenge everyone 
expects Rwanda to achieve through its economic performance. Rwanda is not yet fully engaged 
in industrialization. This is an important and crucial problem because industrialization is a 
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concept which goes beyond having industries and Rwanda remains committed to realize this 
objective.  
Before, manufacturing and industry sectors were the engine of economic transformation. 
Today, new technologies have spawned a growing number of services and agri-food sectors, 
including horticulture, which share many features in common with the manufacturing sector. In 
addition, Infrastructure, skills and competition are the three fundamental factors to attract 
investments. It is clear that economic development cannot be achieved without government 
efficient spending in the key sectors mentioned above. Overall, data show that Rwanda is 
spending more than Burundi to finance its development. Looking at Rwanda itself, it has 
spectacular economic performance, but compared to Burundi, the analysis of industry and 
manufacturing dependent variables as already discussed above contradict the remarkable 
economic progress achieved by Rwanda since the genocide of 1994. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 This study has shown the evidence of the outstanding progress accomplished by Rwanda 
in several areas of economic and human development since the genocide. Indeed, Rwanda 
achieved all eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), reduced poverty from 58.9% in 
2000 to 39.1% in 2013 and extreme poverty went from 40% in 2000 to 16.3% in 201326, rebuilt 
socioeconomic infrastructures and economic bureaucracy destroyed during the genocide. Many 
of the achievements under Kagame’s political leadership and Rwandan Patriotic Front which I 
                                                           
26 National Institute of Statistics in Rwanda (NISR) 
http://www.statistics.gov.rw/ 
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often described as a party-state are impressive. Many economic progresses in Rwanda have been 
attributed to developmental state features and a series of economic and political reforms. In fact, 
the government of Rwanda decided to incorporate indigenous knowledge such as Girinka and 
Imihigo together with ubudehe, umuganda, itorero, agaciro, abunzi and gacaca in their policies 
and development strategy (Biedermann, 2015). The GoR increases its legitimacy when it 
manages to improve the quality of life and standard of living for people and wins their trust 
(Hutus and Tutsi) in the long-term developmental agenda.  
While Rwanda and Burundi share many characteristics, there are also important 
differences. We found considerable differences between Rwanda and Burundi in the 
effectiveness of policies formulation and application. The successful economic performance and 
social progress in Rwanda is the primary source of the difference between both countries 
Rwanda and Burundi. Undeniably, Burundi has grown so slowly economically compared to 
Rwanda and it fell again into ethnic violence in 2015 after President Pierre Nkurunziza decided 
to run and won its third term election after the country experienced a true peace from 2003 to 
2015. As Lastinger pointed out “What appears to be central to the disparate trajectories of these 
two countries is the nature of their respective dominant political parties, the source of 
government legitimacy within their societies, and the parameters of the political settlement 
during the transition from conflict to peace. Incorporating these three aspects can help 
international organizations to understand the political drivers in post-conflict states that constrain 
or facilitate economic growth and development (Lastinger, 2017). From this point of view, 
Mukasa (2012) has a very strong argument when he stated, “The role of leadership is shown to 
be an important factor in determining economic growth as in Rwanda’s case and economic 
decline in Burundi’s case” (Mukasa, 2011). Burundi's development lagged far behind Rwanda’s. 
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For instance, in terms of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Burundi did not achieve any 
of the eight goals by 2015. 
In contrast, we find in this study that structural economic transformation is taking place 
in Rwanda, but the country still faces significant challenges. The economic miracle is real, but 
not complete. Rwanda created Rwanda Revenue Authority (RRA) to maximize its tax collection 
and this agency is very effective in the mission, but the country does still not have enough 
resources to spend for building its socioeconomic and productive infrastructures. Rwanda spends 
more money (M2) and contribute more in terms of the percentage of GDP than Burundi in capital 
expenditures. Government finances are still highly dependent on foreign aid and investment has 
been principally led by the public sector (Mold, United Nations, & Economic Commission for 
Africa, 2016). In addition, the private sector is relatively weak. Nevertheless, the party-state RPF 
and army are involved in the private sector under the Tri-Star/CVL and Horizon group, which 
constitutes a big obstacle for the private sector in general to develop and expand properly. It is 
evident, however, that Government of Rwanda (GoR) must continue to intervene efficiently in 
the economy to encourage development. The government of Rwanda creates rent-seeking and 
transforms it to rent creation. Only in Rwanda can Tri-Star CVL and Horizon group benefit most 
of the rents.  As a matter of fact, government should attract more local and foreign direct 
investments (FDI) to strengthen the private sector, which is a true engine of economic growth. 
The main finding of this study is that Agriculture, Services and Exports plus savings 
drive economic growth in Rwanda, which has been strong since 1998. In 2012, Rwanda 
completed the first modern Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Kigali.27 However, when compared 
                                                           
27Indexmundi. Rwanda vs. Burundi – economy comparison 
https://www.indexmundi.comfactbook/compare/rwanda.burundi/economy 
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to Burundi a country that the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
acknowledged to have been grown slowly economically, Rwanda performed even poorly in the 
sectors of Industry and Manufacturing than Burundi. Therefore, there is a real need to formulate 
more appropriate industrial Policies to truly sustain economic growth in both countries. Rwanda 
has a comparative advantage in agriculture and it is very committed to modernize and 
industrialize it.  
This is the reason why the GoR is pouring more resources to maximize productivity in 
Agriculture. It also means the government in Rwanda is aware that building strong industries and 
manufacturing activities demand long-term dedication, patience, trainings, and skills. In order to 
achieve the goal of industrialization, Rwanda must efficiently invest in education to acquire 
human capital. Industrialization and human capital go hand by hand and they are strongly 
correlated. Industry and manufacturing mean much more than having schools and machines. It 
means building linkages, strong institutions, acquiring technology and expertise, spillovers, 
public goods, engineers, and all whose knowledge must be used to nurture industries. We 
understand that the threshold of human capital remains low and while Rwanda is catching up to 
increase its skilled workforce, it is reasonable for this country to develop agriculture in the first 
place. Another important point to mention is that there are a couple major problems in Rwanda’s 
economic model such as an absence of sound industry policies, a lack of democracy, and the 
relationship of the RPF and state are ambiguous, which is at once an effective and authoritarian 
state. 
Kagame’s leadership and the RPF kept the country stable without any major conflict after 
the genocide of 1994, except the long period of insecurity and insurgency of genocidaires who 
hide in the forest in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The actions of 
79 
chasing genocidaires in the DRC to capture and bring them to justice is at the source of recurrent 
violence and military conflict between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The security and democracy situations remain crucial in Rwanda and Burundi. Some studies 
began to show that the current regime is building up the same conditions that lead Rwanda to the 
genocide in 1994.  It is a sarcastic situation (Ayittey, 2017). Burundi continues to face many 
political and economic challenges. Both countries must improve democracy promotion efforts 
and create conditions of the true dialogue and reconciliation between Hutus and Tutsis to 
establish genuine political stability, which is the fundamental condition for economic 
development to take place. 
It is too soon to tell if the economic model of Rwanda is appropriate for African 
countries. Rwanda is a small country with only two main ethnic groups compared to large 
countries like Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Cameroon, Cote D’Ivoire, to 
name a few, which are composed of multiple ethnic groups and tribes making governance more 
difficult. Indeed, economic, financial, and even the social situation in most African countries is 
very critical and complex and it seems obvious that without democracy and freedom, the 
Rwanda model may not work anywhere else in Africa. Africa's development model leaves 
economists perplexed.  
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VIII. Appendices 
Appendix A: Data Files 
Rwa_Bur_Data_DSD11018.dta 
 
 
Here is the list of the 11 important variables from our dataset. 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in National Currency (Billions) 
• GDP growth rate  
• GDP per capita in National Currency (Thousands) 
• Life Expectancy at Birth (years) 
• Children of under-five deaths in Numbers (Thousands) 
• Human Capital Index, based on years of schooling and returns to education 
• Agriculture, value-added (% of GDP) 
• Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
• Industry, value-added (% of GDP) 
• Manufacturing, value-added (% of GDP) 
• Services, value-added (% of GDP) 
 
 
  
Rwa_Bur_Data_DSD11018.dta
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Appendix B: Do Files for Regressions Analyses 
cd "C:\Users\maxime\Desktop" 
use "C:\Users\maxime\Desktop\Rwa_Bur_Data_DSD11018.dta", clear 
log using Rwa_Bur_Data_DSD11018.dta, replace text 
gen TREATED = 1 if CountryName=="Rwanda" 
replace TREATED = 0 if CountryName=="Burundi" 
gen AFTER = 1 if Time>1994 
replace AFTER = 0 if Time<1994 
gen TREATED_AFTER = TREATED*AFTER 
gen Timesquared = Time^2 
gen Timecubic = Time^3 
gen TREATEDTime = TREATED*Time 
gen TREATEDTimesquared = TREATED*Timesquared 
gen TREATEDTimecubic = TREATED*Timecubic 
gen lRealGrossDomesticProductNat =log( RealGrossDomesticProductNat ) 
gen lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu =log(RealGDPpercapitaNationalCu) 
gen lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal =log(Lifeexpectancyatbirthtotal) 
gen lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum =log(NumberofunderfivedeathsNum) 
gen lHumancapitalindexbasedonye =log(Humancapitalindexbasedonye) 
gen lExportsofgoodsandservices =log(Exportsofgoodsandservices) 
gen lServicesetcvalueaddedo =log(Servicesetcvalueaddedo) 
gen lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP =log(IndustryvalueaddedofGDP) 
gen lManufacturingvalueaddedof =log(Manufacturingvalueaddedof) 
drop in 20 
drop in 58 
twoway (connected lRealGrossDomesticProductNat Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lRealGrossDomesticProductNat Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Gross Domestic Product in national Currency (Billions)) legend(on order(1  
"RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lRealGrossDomesticProductNat Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lRealGrossDomesticProductNat Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
85 
title( Gross Domestic Product in National Currency (Billions)) legend(on order(1  
"RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( GDP per capita in National Currency (Thousands)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  
"BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected GDPgrowthrate Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
GDPgrowthrate Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( GDP growth rate) 
legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Life Expectancy at Birth (years)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Children of under-five deaths in Numbers (Thousands)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  
2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lHumancapitalindexbasedonye Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lHumancapitalindexbasedonye Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Human Capital Index based on years of schooling) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  
"BURUNDI")) 
gen lAgriculturevalueaddedofG =log(AgriculturevalueaddedofG) 
twoway (connected lAgriculturevalueaddedofG Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lAgriculturevalueaddedofG Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( 
Agriculture - value added (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lExportsofgoodsandservices Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lExportsofgoodsandservices Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Exports 
of goods and services (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Industry - 
value added (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lManufacturingvalueaddedof Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lManufacturingvalueaddedof Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( 
Manufacturing - value added (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lServicesetcvalueaddedo Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lServicesetcvalueaddedo Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Services - 
value added (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
gen lDeathratecrudenumbersper =log(Deathratecrudenumbersper) 
gen lBirthratecrudenumberspe =log(Birthratecrudenumberspe) 
gen lGrosscapitalformationofGD =log(GrosscapitalformationofGD) 
destring Enrolmentinprimaryeducation, generate(nEnrolmentinprimaryeducation) force 
destring Enrolmentinsecondaryeducation, generate(nEnrolmentinsecondaryeducation) force 
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gen lnEnrolmentinprimaryeducation = log(nEnrolmentinprimaryeducation) 
gen lnEnrolmentinsecondaryeducation = log(nEnrolmentinsecondaryeducation) 
twoway (connected lDeathratecrudenumbersper Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lDeathratecrudenumbersper Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Death Rate 
in Numbers (per 1,000 people)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lBirthratecrudenumberspe Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lBirthratecrudenumberspe Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Birth Rate 
in Numbers (per 1,000 people)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lGrosscapitalformationofGD Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) (connected 
lGrosscapitalformationofGD Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) title( Gross 
Capital Formation (% of GDP)) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  "BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lnEnrolmentinprimaryeducation Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lnEnrolmentinprimaryeducation Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Enrolment in Primary Education in Numbers) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  
"BURUNDI")) 
twoway (connected lnEnrolmentinsecondaryeducation Time if TREATED==1, msymbol(Oh)) 
(connected lnEnrolmentinsecondaryeducation Time if TREATED==0, msymbol(S)), xline(1994) 
title( Enrolment in Secondary Education in Numbers) legend(on order(1  "RWANDA"  2  
"BURUNDI")) moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, 
cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
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vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
TREATEDTime, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGrossDomesticProductNat TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, cl(CountryName) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared TREATEDTime 
TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic TREATEDTime 
TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( CountryName 
Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( CountryName 
Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress GDPgrowthrate TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared TREATEDTime 
TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
88 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress RealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
TREATEDTime, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lRealGDPpercapitaNationalCu TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
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vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
TREATEDTime, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
TREATEDTime, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lNumberofunderfivedeathsNum TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lLifeexpectancyatbirthtotal TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
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moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
Timesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time 
TREATEDTime, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lHumancapitalindexbasedonye TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared TREATEDTime 
TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
91 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lServicesetcvalueaddedo TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lExportsofgoodsandservices TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
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moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lIndustryvalueaddedofGDP TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
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vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lManufacturingvalueaddedof TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
Timecubic, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER, cl( Time ) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cl(CountryName) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cl(CountryName) 
moulton lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared Timecubic 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared TREATEDTimecubic, cl(CountryName) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER i.Time, cluster( 
CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time TREATEDTime, 
cluster( CountryName Time ) 
vce2way regress lAgriculturevalueaddedofG TREATED AFTER TREATED_AFTER Time Timesquared 
TREATEDTime TREATEDTimesquared, cluster( CountryName Time ) 
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Appendix C: Figures 
 
Death Rate in Numbers (per 1,000 people) 
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Birth Rate in Numbers (per 1,000 people).  
 
 
 
Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
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Enrolment in Primary Education in numbers 
 
 
 
Enrolment in Secondary Education in numbers 
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Appendix D: Data Sources 
The sources for my data collection include:  
(1) The World Bank Databank,  
(2) The International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
(3) The Penn World Tables (PWT),  
(4) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT), and  
(5) Index Mundi. 
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